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## ETHNIC GENTRIFICATION THE SILENT FIGHT FOR A MACEDONIAN CITY<sup>2</sup>

*Abstract:* Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia we can see a significant growth in the importance of ethnic identity in the Balkan states. In effect, since than an irredentist tendency can be seen in the region. The struggle for the creation of a monoethnic country turn into civil wars in the Balkan peninsula in the early 1990s. Macedonia, against a background of ex – republics of Yugoslavia, was relatively stable. However, it does not mean that the ethnicity did not play a great role in independent Macedonia. Ethnicity leaves its mark on politics, society and Macedonian cities. In recent years, the local government of Tetovo-a city in the north-western part of Macedonia-has been trying to impose a new identity. This local policy fits in with the wider national fight for national identity<sup>3</sup> and over possession of the city’s public spaces. Simultaneously, we can witness the process of Albanian community emancipation that has influenced social relations. As a result of the changes, the ethnic Macedonians are being pushed out from Tetovo, the second biggest city in the country. In this paper I will argue that what we are witnessing can be called *Ethnic Gentrification*. I will try to develop the concept of gentrification (Glass 1964) and briefly discuss the legitimacy of broadening well-established concepts.

*Key words:* ethnic gentification, ghettoization, ethnicization, Tetovo, Macedonia.

Tetovo has always been inhabited by people representing different cultures. In Ottoman times, citizens had freedom of faith, enjoyed cultural autonomy, and lived in relatively peaceful coexistence in separated districts. However mixed marriages could rarely be found in the region (Geber 1997: 107-110). Social, economic, geographic circumstances have changed since then<sup>4</sup>. From the end of Second World War Albanians,

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<sup>2</sup> It is an expanded version of the text “Gentryfikacja Etniczna – Cicha Walka o Macedońskie Miasto,” published originally in the Polish quarterly *respublica.pl*.

<sup>3</sup> In 2010 the right- wing Macedonian party VMRO DPMNE announced the setting up of the project “Skopje 2014”. It aims to change the city’s identity from a socialist to an ancient Macedonian one. “Skopje 2014” denies previous modernistic urban planning and excludes the presence of Albanian symbols in public spaces. Today, in the heart of the capital of Macedonia, governmental buildings, museums and theaters in a neoclassical style are appearing. Statues and monuments of ancient heroes are being erected in different parts of the city. The “investing plan” is part of a wider project of shifting the national identity from one of brotherhood and equality to an ethnic one, which is based on division and dislike of other ethnicities (see also Mijalkovic, Urbanek 2011).

<sup>4</sup> This paper is based on field work which consisted of a year-long stay in Tetovo at the turn of 2009 and 2010 and few shorter, two-three week visits, between October 2011 and May 2014.

were discriminated against in Tetovo as well as in all of Yugoslavia. According to Rozita Dimova, the power among different nations in Yugoslavia was unequally distributed. Certain nation, especially those who had their own republic, had enjoyed power and fuelled different processes of inclusion and exclusion of minorities. A good example of exclusion and marginalization can be the Albanian minority (2007: 2). Albanians did not fit in the new country of Yugoslavia, literally the “Southern Slavs” (Pulton 2000: 59). They had never had their own republic and were not recognized as *narod* by the Yugoslav government (Brown 2003: 48 – 49). Nevertheless, with a high birth rate, the Albanian migration from rural areas to the city, and the conflict between the Albanian Liberation Army and Macedonian Police and Army Forces in 2001 led to a shift of power. As a result of the changes and the indicative policy of the Albanians, Macedonians are now being systematically concentrated in impoverished districts and pushed out from the city by the economically and politically stronger Albanians. In Western Europe and America, the process of displacing the lower social classes, which is often accompanied by the simultaneous mobility of capital was named “gentrification” by Ruth Glass (1964). Gentrification in its most classical definition, states that it is a phenomenon by which higher economic classes overtake districts inhabited by lower classes.

*One by one, many of the working class quarters have been invaded by the middle class – upper and lower ... Once this process of gentrification starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the working class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is changed (Glass 1964: 7).*

As proved by Neil Smith (1996: 173), gentrification has many constant features, such as privatization of housing, the flow of a new middle class to the inner cities, disproportionate amounts of new capital invested in different parts of the city and a neoliberal urban policy; but it might adopt different forms. It depends on the peculiarities of the local economy, cultural organization in the national and global economy and urban (or local) policy (Smith 2010: 52). Gentrification in global cities does not have the same pattern as in provincial cities, where the inter-urban context and correlation between the city and its neighbourhoods play a major role (see: Dutton 2005).

The term “gentrification” has dominated the way of conceptualizing changes in cities all over the world. It neither refers to only Western European and North American cities, nor to global cities like New York, London or Sydney. Today we distinguish between the gentrification of post-communist cities, post-colonial cities and even rural gentrification. Rowland Atkinson and Gary Bridge (2005: 2) raise the questions: to what extent is gentrification a global phenomenon with all its diversity and characteristics, and in what kinds of forms can it manifest itself? They argue that contemporary gentrification takes the form of colonialism *as a cultural force in its privileging of whiteness, as well as the more class-based identities and preferences in urban living* (2005: 2). In post-socialist Yugoslavian cities, the whiteness of the gentrifiers does not play a major role, but rather the colonial style of gentrification. It manifests itself by imposing the culture of the ethnic majority and monopolization of power by one ethnic group. The examination of empirical research in Macedonia highlights the importance of ethnicity in social and urban changes. The division of Macedonian society by ethnicity reflects the national discourse, relations between national and ethnic minorities and the national majority, as well as division of the political scene along ethnic lines (Lubaš 2011: 32). Furthermore, shift in the last decade of

the XXth century, from civic state to state, based on ethnicity, justifies that approach (Risteski 2012). What is more, post-conflict agreement led to the institutionalization of ethnicity – writes Florian Bieber (2004: 2). It means that ethnic parity established ethnic groups' or rather ethnic niches in state institutions, including the legislature, executive, judiciary and public administration. From the bottom level up, nowadays, ethnic affiliation often matters more than social or economic status (Bieber 2004: 2). Taking the above into account, the extension of the term gentrification by the adjective *ethnic* seems to be necessary because the expulsion of an ethnic group from Tetovo bears the features of gentrification, like reduce of number of blue-collar jobs, impoverishment and displacement of old residents, disproportionate amounts of new capital investment and finally change of social or ethnic composition of districts. In this case, however, it is not social classes, but ethnic groups that are the subjects of displacement.

The aim of this article is to expand the term *Gentrification* by ethnicity and implicate it in the analysis of the post-socialist transformation of provincial cities in Macedonia. I changed the emphasis from social classes, which dominate in terms of conceptualization the changes in the cities, to ethnic groups<sup>5</sup>. I understand *Ethnic Gentrification* as the process of displacing one ethnic group by another in a city. There are two major elements of that process: the first is the ethnicization of Macedonian society, in other words it is a division of Macedonia citizens along ethnic lines. Secondly, ghettoization of ethnic Macedonians in certain parts of the city. Ghettoization, following Hiebert et al (2007), I understand as intending segregation in *extensive areas that are dominated by single ethnocultural groups, which are also areas of socio-economical marginalization*. At the beginning of this paper, I will shed some light on local and national context and Albanian nationalist movements. Later on, I will focus on the process of emancipation of the Albanians and the decline in living standards of ethnic Macedonians. Then I will move on to ghettoization, and expulsion of Macedonians from public spaces. In the last part, I will show the correlation between ethnic gentrification and studentification (Smith 2005), which is a recommodification of the neighbourhood according to the Albanian students' needs.

## Characteristics of Tetovo

Tetovo is a multi-ethnic city in the northwestern part of Macedonia where Albanians dominate. According to statistics from 2002<sup>6</sup> (the only ones available), Albanians constitute 55% of the population, Macedonians 35%, Roms 4.5%, and Turks 3.5%. The total population of Tetovo amounts to 52,915 inhabitants, and constitutes a part of the larger Tetovo municipality with its 86,580 people<sup>7</sup>. The city lies at the foothills of

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<sup>5</sup> With reference to Fredrik Barth (1969), I understand ethnic groups as form of group organizations, which defined the values for inter-ethnic interaction in order to maintain borders. Ethnic differences and categories crystalizes in contact with other group and their significance change according to groups need. The main features of ethnic identity is self-ascriptions and ascription by others to categorizes themselves and other in purpose of interaction. (1969: 12 – 14).

<sup>6</sup> [www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga\\_13.pdf](http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga_13.pdf). (insight 18.08.2014)

<sup>7</sup> [www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga\\_13.pdf](http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga_13.pdf). (insight 18.08.2014)

the Shar Mountains, which create a natural border with Kosovo. Tetovo underwent radical urban changes during the period of modernization in socialist Yugoslavia. Buildings in the typical Ottoman architectural style were replaced by those built in the modernist style. High blocks of flats started to dominate over low Ottoman constructions. The centre of the city was moved from the area of the Pena River and the Colorful Mosque (*Šarena Džamija*) to the north-east side. All signs under previous Ottoman power were replaced by Yugoslav ones. In 2001, Albanian partisans supported by the Kosovo Liberation Army when they started armed riots and demanded more rights for the Albanian community in Macedonia. This event established Albanian power in Tetovo and in the Polog Region. Nowadays, Tetovo is considered to be the Albanian capital in Macedonia due to the size and power of the local Albanian community.

To get a better picture of Tetovo, a few words should be mentioned about the national context. Until Second World War the nationality had sometimes been very confusing in this region. For some people a person could be Bulgarian for others Greek. National categories were ambiguous (Brown 2003: 61). After 1945, the Macedonian identity was strengthened by Josip Broz Tito in order to establish Yugoslav power in the region and cool Bulgarian aspiration to that territory. Macedonia, as an independent state, appeared on the political map for the first time in modern history in 1991. From the beginning of its independence, the state was facing a strong Albanian national movement (Danforth 1995: 145, Brown 2003: 33). An Albanian separatist movement in neighboring with Macedonian Kosovo made Macedonians feel threatened. Macedonian and Albanian political parties acquired a purely ethnic character and opted for representing the interests of only one ethnic group. Social attitudes towards its neighbours radicalised. Changes at an international level also might be seen as well – some external powers question the Macedonian state and even Macedonian identity; Greek authorities claim the exclusive right to use the name of Macedonia; Bulgarians did not recognize Macedonian language (see: Danforth 1995).

## The Albanian National Movement

The Albanian national movement in Macedonia has been constantly visible since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In 1991, they boycotted the referendum on the country's independence (Lubaš 2011: 35, see also Risteski, Kodra Hysa 2014). A year later, they announced their own referendum “for” or “against” the autonomy of “Illyria” – the western part of Macedonia, inhabited mainly by the Albanian minority. Although 99% of the people voted “for”, autonomy was not granted, and the referendum was declared invalid by officials in Skopje and the international community (Kopp 2001: 44). The Albanian community was fighting for its political autonomy and access to higher education in its own language, but with little effect. The Macedonian state also did not recognize the new Albanian university in Tetovo. In 1997, the mayor of Gostivar, a city located 25 km away from Tetovo, hung Albanian and Turkish flags outside the town hall. These and other, smaller events ended with protests, clashes with the police, arrests, and even the deaths of several demonstrators. This contributed to increased instability in the region.

The tipping point for the city was the conflict between the Albanian Liberation Army and the Macedonian Police and Armed Forces in 2001, when the Albanian

partisans, supported by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), took up arms and came out for more rights for the Albanian minority in Macedonia. The conflict ended with the Ohrid Agreement on August 13, 2001. Boris Trajkovski, president of the Republic of Macedonia and representatives of other parties (including the Albanian one) approved the conditions of the agreement, which aimed to ensure Albanians' rights and to encourage their integration with Macedonian society. The signed document asserted recognition of the Albanian language as an official language in the areas where Albanians make up more than 20% of the population (Eberhardt 2005: 148). Additionally, the agreement began the decentralization of power, gave more autonomy to the Albanians at the local and regional level, and broke down the Macedonian monopoly on power that they had exercised since the creation of Yugoslavia. The administrative reform of Macedonia was introduced in 2004. The number of municipalities was reduced from 123 to 84. Tetovo's borders were expanded through the incorporation of rural municipalities, such as Šipkovića and Džepčište, populated almost entirely by ethnic Albanians. Tetovo's population grew by almost a quarter, from 65 thousand to 87 thousand<sup>8</sup>, thanks mainly to the new municipalities' inhabited predominantly by Albanian population. Just after the conflict, in October 2001, the new Private University of South-Eastern Europe (SEEU) was opened, and three years later, the Macedonian government recognized the Albanian State University in Tetovo. The introduction of the Ohrid Agreement contributed to the establishment of Albanian power in the city and the expansion of Albanians' rights. As a result, Tetovo became a more friendly place for them – they can, for instance, be educated in their own language and find work in the public sector. The parity of employment to equal the opportunity in public administration has been helping Albanians on the labour market and has made some Macedonians leave their jobs. The Albanian's economic growth has given them a chance to travel or migrate permanently to Tetovo. Hundreds of buses circulate between Tetovo and small villages in the region, filled with Albanian children and adults who study and work in the city.

Since street names became a part of the struggle for urban space, they reflect the ideology of the terrain's ruler, writes Pierre Bourdieu in "Language and Symbolic Power" (1991). Using the official names became the means of regulation and control over the people. They fulfill this function especially in public places, among the lower social class, and in a time of increased social tensions or political radicalism, notes Azaryahu Maoz (1996: 314).

Since the Ohrid Agreement, where I seek the causes of a shift of power in the city, the semiotic landscape has been subjected to negotiations. The rich history of the city has been reduced to a few key symbols, dates or events, which have become, as Pierre Nora says, places of memory (*lieux de mémoire*). The public institutions, the monuments, streets and schools names, hiding various political and cultural meanings, are always connected to social memory and political identity. A good example of such negotiations of Tetovo's identity might be the main square, called Marshall Tito Square. After Second World War, the center of the city was decorated with a fountain and statues of Macedonian partisans who fought against *Balli Kombetar* – the Albanian army during Second World War (see: Falczak and Wasilewski 1985: 487, 494) – and struggled for socialist revolution. The state of the square commemorating Yugoslav victory with the passage of time deteriorated.

<sup>8</sup> [www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga\\_13.pdf](http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/kniga_13.pdf) (insight 18.08.2014)

Up until the end of the 1990s, it reflected the conditions of post-socialist Yugoslavia: the marble monuments cracked and the fountain broke down. Macedonian monuments of national and socialist heroes have fallen down. The Albanian mayor issued a resolution ordering the renovation of the square. The marble statues of antifascist Macedonian partisans were removed. The name of the square also changed from Marshal Tito Square to Illyrians Square – Illyrians are believed to be the ancestors of Albanians. Together with the changes, a huge billboard of the ruling Albanian party DUI – Democratic Union for Integration – appeared above the square. The town hall officials also renamed the streets<sup>9</sup>. The main boulevard's name was changed from Marshal Tito Street to Iliria Street. The new name was also given to the street where the City Council is located – it was changed from *Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija* (Yugoslav National Army) to Derwish Cara<sup>10</sup>.

Physical and symbolic changes in public space influenced perception and the way of using it. After the renovation of the main square, Macedonians do not visit it. They say that the new shape and look of it does not appeal them. A twenty-four-year-old Macedonian said:

*We used to have marble here before, cafes and restaurants around the square and in the middle there was a fountain and monuments of heroes from the Second World War. There was a stage and concerts. They destroyed everything. There is nothing to do and I do not feel OK here.*

As a matter of fact, from time to time, there are concerts, but mostly performed by Albanian artists. The square has become crowded and vibrant. Albanian children are playing and frolicking there constantly, while their parents relax in cafes. In 2011, a new shopping mall named Iliria was opened in the square. Above mentioned changes might impose an Albanian identity on the city. The new identity of Tetovo is being created without taking into account the voice of the minority. The Albanian local government, by enforcing their history and urban policy, is excluding and marginalizing Macedonians.

## Economic Enhancement

One of the factors that facilitates the ethnic gentrification of Tetovo is the enrichment of Albanians. As mentioned above, the Albanian community in the time of Yugoslavia was discriminated against. They were excluded from the labour market and the effects of Yugoslavia's modernization. As Rozita Dimova argue, while Macedonians were involved in massive internal migration in their own country – so-called “village-town” migration, the ethnic Albanian rarely left their rural surrounding. Their large households with communal farm cultivated by several family members, could not be maintain by only one worker's wage (2007: 5).

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<sup>9</sup> In a similar vein, the Skopje town hall adopted the decision to rename around 100 streets. Names which commemorated community heroes were changed first. For more information, see: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/new-kind-of-street-battle-grips-macedonia-s-capital>(insight: 09.02.2014)

<sup>10</sup> Albanian revolutionary from Tetovo, the leader of the Albanian revolt in 1844 known as the “Uprising of Dervish Cara.”



The only way to support their households was emigration, but the Yugoslav state primarily facilitated the emigration of professionals and skilled workers from richer urban areas of Slovenia and Croatia. It was part of a larger modernization project of the country. Emigrants were supposed to acquire new experience, capital and know-how during their stay abroad and bring it back to Yugoslavia to stimulate the local economy. The government's assumption turned out to be wrong and these emigrants never came back. The course of the migration policy was changed by the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party in 1965. The government started to support people from the least economically developed regions of Yugoslavia like Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dimova 2007: 5). Albanians found labour emigration as a way to fight against the structural obstructions like large households, rural lifestyles and lack of education. Paradoxically, only by emigration from Yugoslavia they could become the part of mainstream Yugoslav society (Dimova 2007: 6).

From the 1960s mainly male Albanians, uneducated, from monoethnic rural and underdeveloped regions, migrated in order to maintain multigenerational households (Dahinden 2005: 194, Dimova 2007: 5). Initially seasonal migration evolved later into permanent migration. Their main destinations were Switzerland, Austria, Germany and Italy (Lubaś 2011: 34). The Yugoslav state developed various programs and bilateral agreements to support migration and migrants. The agreements with host countries considerably increased opportunities for successful emigration (Dahinden 2010: 55). However, among the emigrants were also ethnic Macedonians, but they left less frequently and since they left the country they have rarely come back home. They did not develop attachments to their home country (Bielenin-Lenczowska 2010). Meanwhile, Albanians during their short stays in their home country, fulfil their family obligations, conduct business and build houses. Many of them come back with know-how and capital acquired abroad.

While Albanians were struggling with daily life and migration under Tito's regime, ethnic Macedonians led the country. Macedonians occupied the highest posts in public institutions, and built houses in the central part of the city. At this time, the richest district of Tetovo – *Ajdučko Maalo* (in which state dignitaries lived) was built. When ethnic Macedonians were moving to the cities and taking part in the process of modernization of the country, Albanians were still passed over.

Not only were the city elites comprised of Macedonians, but they also constituted the core of the working class. It was mainly they, and to a lesser extent Albanians, who worked in Tetovo and its surrounding industries, in companies such as Tetex, Medicinska Plastika and JugoChrom. After the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, heavy industry collapsed. It was an effect of, on the one hand by, civil war in the former state of Yugoslavia and, on the other hand by, an economic transformation to a neoliberal economy. In Tetovo some factories, e.g. Tetex, were privatized, but most were closed. Macedonians lost their jobs and remained unemployed. The result of the harsh transformation was that the working class not only lost jobs, but was also marginalized, writes Erzsebet Szalai (2005), following Eszter Bartbe. The sense of economic security, which Macedonians enjoyed in the time of Yugoslavia, disappeared. The changes touched mainly Macedonians rather than Albanians, because during socialist times, the former were employed in the public sector (Lubaś 2011: 34), while the latter engaged in the more independent forms of state activities.

*From the beginning of 1990 until 2009, all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia have had limited access to foreign labour markets in terms of reaching western labour markets and visas. The recruitment of workers from former Yugoslavia was no longer possible. A shift in EU countries' migration policies for non-EU citizens from recruitment based on nationality to one based on professional skills obstructed Macedonian citizens' emigration. Many countries have begun to give work permits, not to certain nations, but to particular professional groups<sup>11</sup>. Ethnicity and nationality do not play a major role any more (Dahinden 2005: 194, see also Joppke 2007).*

In any case, Albanians were more successful in emigration than Macedonians thanks to social capital abroad (Dimova 2007: 11). Albanians built “bounded solidarity” in their host countries. Janine Denidhen defines it as a “kind of solidarity [which] is based on the mobilization of collective representations and on a process of ‘we-group’ formation and therefore a result of social inclusion and exclusion” (2005: 198). It enhanced and facilitated migration by decreasing costs and risks. Albanian emigrants, even after a change of migration regimes in European countries, could find their way to host countries. However, from the middle of the 1990s, many Albanians decided to return. The main reason was family ties, the fear of cultural assimilation in their host country, and new possibilities in independent Macedonia. Most of my research partners decided to come back when their children were just about high school age. They were afraid that an extended stay in the host country would prevent them from returning back with their children. They invest their savings in real estate and enterprises. Some of them became very successful businessmen. Their major advantages over local entrepreneurs are transnational contacts, capital and know-how brought from abroad. A good example might be one of the most successful entrepreneurs in Tetovo, a forty-six-year-old man, who worked for seven years on a chicken farm in Germany. In cooperation with his German boss, he invested in the same sort of company in the neighbourhoods of Tetovo. He highlighted his emigration experience and German capital as the main factors that contributed to the success of his business. He currently employs 600 workers, mainly Albanians. It is worth mentioning that today, many Albanian households in Tetovo are supported by the closest family members living abroad. They sponsor education, and lend money to start small enterprises.

While from the beginning of 1990s we have been witnessing a significant pauperization of the Macedonian community in Tetovo, Albanians have been getting richer and are creating a new middle class. After deindustrialization, the service sector grew mainly thanks to private enterprises owned by Albanians.

## Ghettoization

Ethnic gentrification in Tetovo was, no doubt, intensified by the war, which contribute to change of ethnic composition of the mixed neighbourhoods and in certain

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<sup>11</sup> Some Macedonians, in order to get access to EU labour markets, search for their Bulgarian roots and apply for Bulgarian citizenship, instrumental in using Bulgarian claims on Macedonian identities and territory (see Neofotistos 2009).



points of the whole city. After the conflict in 2001 a sense of danger increased among Macedonians. It was connected directly to the personal experience of war. A twenty-two-year-old woman said:

*During the conflict many families decided to run away to Skopje. Only a few men were left in the city to guard their homes. Me and my family stayed in Tetovo, because we didn't have relatives in the capital. I remember KLA soldiers went through my block of flats. Albanian soldiers went house-to-house, despite the assurances of the Albanian inhabitants that no one was hidden here and they have nothing to do here. They came to my floor, there was no one besides me and my family. They were breaking doors and entering every single flat. When the time came to ours, they skipped it. Since then, I'm afraid of them. Albanians did not do anything to me. During the war, Albanian neighbours were protecting us. My best friend is Albanian, but this doesn't change the fact that I'm afraid of them as a group.*

In her words we can see the ambivalence that characterizes the attitudes of many Macedonians and Albanians. Often, they stressed that in their group of friends there are representatives of both ethnic groups and they get along with each other. But while we were talking about the group of Albanians, many of Macedonians expressed their aversion to them. They recalled feelings of fear from the time of war.

That fear was the reason why Macedonians escaped from the city. When the conflict ended, some of them decided to stay in the capital. Some others returned, but at the end of the day they sold their flats and houses located in the neighbourhoods dominated by Albanians and moved to another district or city.

After 2001, many Macedonians left and the city has changed its social and ethnic structure. They moved to blocks of socialistic flats, most frequently in very bad shape. They are concentrated in parts of the city like: *blok 70* – which is an enclave surrounded by Albanian neighbourhoods, or in the area around the road exit towards Skopje. They stand out from newly constructed Albanian buildings, which can be seen in every part of the city. It is worth noting that it is difficult to clearly specify mono-ethnic districts in Tetovo, because Albanians are spread out around the whole city. Nevertheless, there might be indicated parts of the city where Albanians predominate; the left side of the stone bridge or area around the Ivo Ribar Lola street. A concentration of Macedonians around one district or block of flats, on the one hand, has increased the sense of security of Macedonian families, but on the other hand, it has simultaneously led to the ghettoization of the Macedonian minority in Tetovo. Macedonians very rarely venture out to Albanian settlements because they feel scared and do not do shopping in Albanian shops. Albanians do not care as much as Macedonians to whom the shops belong. They move around the city freely.

Many Tetovars who used to live behind the mention above bridge – the part of the city considered to be Albanian – moved closer to the city centre, where socialist blocks prevail. However, it does not mean that the city centre has acquired a more Macedonian character. Actually, quite the opposite is true. In the 1990s, the main street, which used to be called Marshal Tito Boulevard, was full of Macedonian cafes, restaurants and shops. Macedonians sold all their real estate after the conflict and left. Iconic Macedonian bars have been replaced by Albanian ones; for example, the *Makedonska kuca* restaurant, has

changed into the Tirana restaurant. It involved not only a change of name, but also of the entire interior.

The story of the ski resort 10 km away from Tetovo is an interesting and instructive one. *Popova Sapka*, until recently, was the best winter resort in this part of Europe. As a result of the war, cottages, hotels, restaurants and the cable car from Tetovo to *Popova Sapka* were destroyed. Macedonians, fearing further conflicts, limited their visits to the resort and sold their properties. Cottages sold *en masse* attracted predominately Albanian buyers. Today, the resort is eagerly visited by Albanians from Macedonia and Kosovo.

The takeover of clubs, restaurants and other public places by representatives of one ethnic group, is – in terms of ethnicity – tantamount to displacement from public spaces and places of the representatives of other communities. Public life in Tetovo as well as in other parts of Macedonia was always divided (Lubaś 2011: 77). Apparently there were clearly defined social boundaries between ethnic groups. During socialism, public spaces were either Macedonian or Albanian. The first one met in the central part of the city. Initially it was the old part of town (Stara Carsjia), above the main square, then it shifted to the main square and Marshal Tito Street. In contrast to public space, Tetovo's citizens lived in mixed neighbourhood, often at the same street, next to each other. It was difficult to distinguish mono ethnic part

Today, in independent Macedonia, the division of public space continues. Before the conflict in 2001, the trendy place to hang around became a quarter stretching between Marshal Tito Street and Jane Sandanski Street. Albanians, regardless of where their meeting place was, were rarely seen in the centre. The patriarchal organization of Albanian families meant that women stayed at home and men sat in the coffee shops in the old Turkish quarter along the upper part of the river. After the conflict, increasing numbers of Albanian students from the new local universities began to appear on the main street of the city – Illyria. Expensive, fancy bars, with loud Albanian contemporary music, immediately popped up like mushrooms all over the city. Albanian women started to show up in the city's public spaces<sup>12</sup>. They receive education (which was very rare in the time of Yugoslavia), have work and in recent years even frequent the coffee shops. Macedonians moved their meeting places to Boris Kidrik street (parallel to Illyria street), hidden and in the squalid side of the city.

## “Studentification”

While the Albanian community's economic status grew, their presence in urban areas increased. Bohdan Jałowiecki and Marek S. Szczepański notice that the main reason for the spacial mobility of wealthier social classes is a need for better educational facilities (2010: 252). Since the new universities have opened, the southern part of the city has expanded noticeably. The number of university students in Tetovo oscillates around 20,000, while the total number of Tetovo residents, as mentioned above, is 52,915 (data from 2002). Students are coming from Tetovo as well as Skopje and other parts of ex-

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<sup>12</sup> The change of the women's behaviour in the public space of Tetovo is worth deeper examination. I did not manage to explore that subject. I was hindered by my sex from finding young Albanian research partners.

Yugoslavia. Students visibly comprise a significant group in the city. The most numerous group of students is that of children of Albanian emigrants in Western Europe. These parents, or other members of the family, finance the rent or purchase of flats and tuition fees. This contributes to a significant growth in real-estate ownership by Albanians' possession of real estate in Tetovo. It creates a huge demand for housing and increases rents in the city. The growth of the student population requires investments and causes a boom in the construction sector. Several blocks of flats were built along Ilidenska Street. They are, for the most part, rented by students. Multigenerational Albanian houses are partially adapted or rebuilt to fulfill the expectation of students renting. Bars, cafes and the service infrastructure needed for students' consumer lifestyle are appearing. Darren P. Smith (2005) argues that this distinct social, economic and physical transformation of the city represents symptoms of *studentification*.

*At a conceptual level, processes of studentification connotes urban changes which are tied to the recommodification of 'single-family' or the repackaging of existing private rented housing, by small-scale institutional actors (e.g. property owners, investors and developers) to produce and supply houses in multiple occupation (HMO) [HMO- housing and town and country planning legislation] for students (2005: 74).*

This process is similar to, or may even be a part of gentrification, although it might take different forms in different contexts (see: Van Weesep 1994). There is, however, another dimension to the opening of two universities in Tetovo. They have become part of an unjust distribution of education, and in the long run cause unequal access to the labour market. The private SEEU University offers study programs in six departments, in three different languages: Albanian, Macedonian and English. The tuition fees, however, are definitely too high for most Macedonians. The tuition fees range from 1000 to 2000 euros. An average monthly salary oscillates between 90 euro (for a low qualified worker) and 350 euro (for an NGO employee). People working in Tetovo cannot afford to pay for their children's education. Besides the financial barrier, a linguistic one also exists. The University of Tetovo has much lower fees than SEEU (100 euro per semester), but apart from Macedonian philology it does not offer any other degree in Macedonian. Under the law of the Republic of Macedonia, the public University of Tetovo should provide instruction in both Albanian and Macedonian. It is obvious that Macedonians have limited access to higher education at this institution. Many young people travel to attend university in Skopje. But again, not all can afford it, because it entails additional costs of living and renting a flat in the capital. A Tetovo University lecturer says:

*If Macedonians want to get higher education, they can go to college in Skopje.*

## Conclusion

Although many scholars approach the issue of expanding the definition of well-defined terms with reservation, I believe it is necessary to check their utility in different social and political contexts. *Ethnic Gentrification* is not only about privileged groups taking over districts in multiethnic cities. It is the effect of the growing significance of ethnicity and ghettoisation of impoverished ethnic groups in ex – YU cities.

Tetovo was always inhabited by different sociocultural groups. They lived in separated districts and enjoyed autonomy. Since Tito supported recognition of Macedonian nationality and created the republic of Macedonia, the coexistence of Tetovo's inhabitants were affected. Macedonians constituted a privileged group in the new country. They migrated from rural areas to the city and occupied the highest posts in public institutions and rebuilt the city according to brotherhood and Unite – the new Yugoslav doctrine. The dissolution of Yugoslavia contributed to the deterioration in living standards but also left Macedonians without the guarantor of their nation. Tito's policy set up temporal equilibrium between powerful contending forces and craft an illusory unity. He suppressed the faith – in Ottomans times for many groups a determinant of identity – and replaced it with the destructive forces of nationalism (Brown 2003: 25). Seemingly stable ethnic relations in Yugoslavia, regulated by Yugoslav policy, redound with cruel ethnic conflicts in the 1990s, which aimed to establish mono-ethnic countries. As Florian Bieber writes, they were an effect not only of the national mindset of intellectual and political elites, but also of the fear of others or being a minority (2004: 11).

Since Macedonian politics and society have started to polarize along ethnic lines, ethnicity plays a great role in this urban policy. The cities have become an area for the negotiation of power of the ethnic groups. The case of Tetovo, shows that the city is taken over, on the one hand, by erasing the marks of the gentrified ethnic group and on the other hand, by the changing of the ethnic balance and the urban property structure. Wealthier ethnic groups re-buy properties in the most prestigious part of the city. The marginalization of pauperized ethnic groups in the multiethnic city leads to ghettoisation in the undercapitalized districts. Furthermore, the sense of insecurity increases when the minority is removed from territory inhabited by the same nation. Finally, the growth and radical expansion of the city around the university campus, and partly privatised education reconfigures the urban structure and contributes to social inequality.

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