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Historical Overview

John Duckitt

ABSTRACT

The concepts of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination emerged early in the twentieth century and soon became central social issues of the times. Over the next century the way in which these concepts were explained theoretically, the dominant research approaches, and their implications for social policy, underwent systematic historical changes. These can be seen as successive paradigms organizing understanding and inquiry. It is suggested that these paradigmatic transitions did not just represent a systematic evolution of knowledge, but were responses to specific social and historical circumstances. These circumstances made particular questions about the nature and causation of prejudice salient for social scientists, and the paradigms that emerged in response constituted their attempts to answer these questions. These salient questions therefore determined the kinds of theories formulated, issues researched, and the social policies proposed to reduce prejudice. This analysis illustrates how changes in the zeitgeist may constrain and determine social-scientific knowledge.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In historical terms, the social scientific study of prejudice and discrimination began only recently. Both prejudice and discrimination can be seen as uniquely twentieth-century concepts, becoming prominent in the social sciences only in the 1920s. Prior to this, prejudice was typically viewed not as a social problem or a scientific construct; instead negative intergroup attitudes were generally seen as natural and inevitable responses to group differences. After prejudice was 'discovered,' the way in which it was conceptualized seemed to undergo marked changes during the twentieth century. It is suggested that each conceptualization of prejudice derived logically from a particular way of explaining prejudice, which in turn implied particular social policies, forming distinct paradigms of prejudice that dominated different historical periods (Duckitt, 1992).

Why did these shifts occur? One possibility is that they reflected the development of knowledge – the progressive replacement of approaches shown to be inadequate by better theories. Sometimes this does seem to have been the case, but only partially so. For example, the theory of the authoritarian personality, which dominated the 1950s, did have important methodological problems (Altemeyer, 1981), and could not easily explain prejudice at the group or societal level, while the socio-cultural approach, which succeeded it in the 1960s and 1970s could explain group differences in prejudice.

The cognitive perspective, which followed, could account for intergroup bias, stereotyping, and competition in minimal group situations where socio-cultural or personality factors did not appear to be operating.

These shifts in emphasis, however, do not seem to be fully explained in terms of the evolution of knowledge. Typically older perspectives and theories were not refuted, or even shown to be seriously inadequate. Although displaced from the mainstream of psychological interest, they were not discarded, but often remain relevant in accounting for prejudice. It is suggested that instead of new perspectives and approaches replacing their predecessors, they seem to illuminate quite different issues and problems. What appears to happen, therefore, is fundamental shifts of interest away from certain issues concerning the causes of prejudice to new or different ones, which require different theories and perspectives.

Fairchild and Gurin (1978) have suggested that the topics psychologists chose for study reflected events that were of local or national importance at the time, but this seems too limited. Historical events and circumstances can have more profound effects on thinking about prejudice than merely shifting interest to new research topics. Important historical circumstances may make fundamentally new and different questions about the nature of prejudice salient, while obscuring others. This could generate a shift in the way prejudice is conceptualized and explained. New conceptual and explanatory paradigms would then powerfully influence the research issues investigated, and the kind of social policy interventions favored.

It is suggested that at least eight distinct periods in the way in which prejudice has been understood by psychologists may be identified. Each of these periods will be briefly discussed. It will be suggested that social circumstances and historical events, interacting with the evolution of knowledge, seem to have focused attention on different issues and questions in each period. Each question then tended to be associated with a particular image of prejudice, and so generated a distinctive theoretical orientation and social policy emphasis that was widely held during that period (see Table 2.1).

UP TO THE 1920S: RACE PSYCHOLOGY

During the nineteenth century virtually all scientific thought in both America and Europe accepted the idea of race inferiority, and the concept of White racial prejudice was not an issue (Haller, 1971). White attitudes of superiority or antipathy to Blacks were accepted as inevitable and natural responses to the seemingly obvious 'inferiority' and 'backwardness' of Blacks and other colonial peoples.

There was an obvious connection between these attitudes and European colonialism and American slavery or segregation. As Fairchild and Gurin (1978) pointed out, the idea of the superiority of the White race was useful in justifying the subjugation of people of color. These historical circumstances generated an interest among scientists in delineating and explaining the inferiorities of 'backward' races. As a result 'race theories' dominated social scientific thinking about racial differences, and explained Black 'inferiority' in terms of evolutionary backwardness, limited intellectual capacity, and even excess sexual drive (Haller, 1971). With the development of intelligence testing early in the twentieth century, psychologists contributed prominently to research supporting these race theories. In 1925 an influential paper by Thomas Garth in the *Psychological Bulletin* reviewed 73 studies on the issue of race and intelligence, which he concluded seemed to indicate the mental superiority of the White race. These attitudes had their logical social policy expressions in segregation, exclusion, and institutionalized discrimination against these 'backward' peoples.

THE 1920S: RACE PREJUDICE

Samelson (1978) has pointed out that during the 1920s the manner in which psychology defined the 'race problem' changed

Table 2.1 Historical shifts in dominant theoretical and social policy approaches to prejudice

Social and historical context and issues	*Concept of prejudice and dominant theoretical approach*	*Dominant social policy orientation to prejudice and discrimination*
Up to the 1920s: White domination and colonial rule of "backward peoples"	Prejudice as a natural response to the deficiencies of "backward" peoples: Race theories	Domination, discrimination, and segregation are natural and justified social policies
The 1920s: The legitimacy of White domination challenged	Prejudice as irrational and unjustified: Measuring and describing prejudice	Prejudice will fade as the social sciences clarify how wrong and unjustified it is
The 1930s and 1940s: The ubiquity and tenacity of White racism	Prejudice as an unconscious defence: Psychoanalytic and frustration theories	Gradual acceptance as minorities and colonial peoples become assimilated
The 1950s: Nazi racial ideology and the holocaust	Prejudice rooted in anti-democratic ideology and authoritarian personalities	Democracy and liberal values will erode intolerance and prejudice
The 1960s: The problem of institutionalised racism in the American South	Sociocultural explanations: Racism rooted in social norms of discriminatory social structures	Desegregation and anti-discriminatory laws will erode and eliminate racism and prejudice
The 1970s: The problem of informal racism and discrimination in the North	Prejudice as an expression of dominant group interests in maintaining intergroup inequality	Reducing intergroup inequality through affirmative action and minority empowerment
The 1980s and 1990s: The stubborn persistence of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination	Prejudice as an expression of universal cognitive processes: Social categorization and identity	Multicultural policies to provide minorities with esteem, positive identities, and foster tolerance
Post 2000: Confronting a complex world of multiple based and often irrationally intense intergroup hostilities	Prejudice as complex, affective, and motivationally driven?	Broader approaches with strategies flexibly adapted to varying patterns of prejudice and situational dynamics?

completely: 'In 1920 most psychologists believed in the existence of mental differences between races; by 1940 they were searching for the sources of "irrational prejudice". In a few decades, a dramatic reversal of the dominant paradigm for the study of groups and group relations had occurred' (p. 265). It is tempting to see this as an example of the progress of empirical science: the triumph of objective data over prejudices, misconceptions, and speculation. However, this seems to be a myth. Writing many decades later in 1978, Samelson noted the then current controversy over the heritability of intelligence between respected psychologists at Harvard, Berkeley, and Princeton, a debate even more recently reignited by the book, *The Bell Curve* (Hernstein & Murray, 1994).

This change in the 1920s seems more feasibly interpreted as a response to two important historical developments after the First World War (Milner, 1975). These were the emergence of a Black civil rights movement in the United States and movements challenging White European domination of colonial peoples, both of which gained sympathy among intellectuals and social scientists. Samelson (1978) mentions several other possible factors in the United States. The restriction of immigration in the early 1920s may have shifted attention from justifying the exclusion of certain peoples to conflict resolution within the country. The period was also characterized by an influx of 'ethnics', particularly Jewish people, into the profession of psychology, a leftward shift among psychologists during the Depression, and finally, a desire to unite the country against an enemy proclaiming racial superiority.

Overall, these historical developments influenced a rapid shift among social scientists away from beliefs of White racial superiority

and the inferiority of other races. This, however, raised a crucial question. If other races were not inferior, how could their deprivations and stigmatization be explained? According to Milner (1975), Floyd Allport in 1924 was the first social psychologist to explicitly pose this issue with the statement: 'The discrepancy in mental ability is not great enough to account for the problem, which centers around the American Negro or to explain fully *the ostracism* to which he is subjected' (p. 21; italics in the original).

In order to answer this question, psychologists shifted their attention to White racial attitudes. With the belief in racial equality came the idea that negative White racial attitudes were unjustified and unfair. This resulted in the emergence of the concept of prejudice as a basically unjustified, irrational, or, in some way faulty, negative intergroup attitude.

Initially research focused on measuring racial prejudice and delineating its extent. Bogardus published his research on the social distance scale in 1925, and in the next decade literally hundreds of studies were reported describing social distance patterns. Katz and Braly's (1933) stereotype checklist had a similar impact, followed by the use of Thurstone and later Likert scaling to measure interracial attitudes. The major social policy implication of the 'discovery' of prejudice as a profoundly irrational, and unjust group attitude held by Whites seems to have been the optimistic assumption that as social scientists identified and documented the problem, knowledge and rationality would gradually banish the injustice of prejudice.

The identification, measurement, and description of the extent of racial prejudice, however, raised a new question – that of how prejudice was to be explained. During the 1930s social scientists began to turn their attention to this issue.

THE 1930S AND 1940S: PSYCHODYNAMIC PROCESSES

Research soon revealed that White racism was both widespread and highly resistant to change, and that merely identifying the problem would not banish it. This raised an important question. If racism was a fundamentally irrational and unjustified response, how could its pervasiveness and tenacity be explained? Psychodynamic theory seemed to answer this question neatly in terms of the operation of universal psychological processes such as defense mechanisms. These processes operated unconsciously, channeling tensions arising either within the personality or from environmental frustrations and threats into prejudice against minorities. The universality of these processes accounted for the ubiquity of prejudice, and their unconscious defensive function for its irrationality and rigidity.

A variety of psychodynamic processes were implicated, such as projection, scapegoating, repressed frustration, and displaced hostility. These processes were elegantly integrated into a coherent explanation of prejudice in terms of displaced aggression, originating from chronic social frustrations, which was directed against minorities as scapegoats (Dollard, Doob, Miller, et al., 1939). This seemed able to explain the ubiquity of White racism in the United States, as well as the rise of Nazism and virulent anti-Semitism in Germany at the time.

These explanations had important social policy implications. Because psychodynamic processes such as displacement and scapegoating were inherently human, they could not be changed easily. However, they would only be directed against outgroups seen as different – culturally, ethnically, and socio-economically. Thus, as culturally different and disadvantaged minorities became more similar to the majority, prejudice and discrimination against them would gradually disappear. The dominant social policy approach of this era was therefore that of assimilation or the 'melting pot'.

This paradigm stimulated research using a variety of strategies. A number of experimental studies during the late 1940s and early 1950s (e.g., Miller & Bugelski, 1948) did seem to support the idea that frustrations could be displaced in the form of prejudice. However, around 1950 attention shifted to a new and different approach to explaining prejudice.

THE 1950S: THE PREJUDICED PERSONALITY

The new paradigm for explaining prejudice that arose after the Second World War and towards the end of the 1940s was initially still psychodynamically based. However, there was a crucial difference. Instead of explaining prejudice in terms of universal intrapsychic processes, the new paradigm viewed prejudice in terms of particular personality structures that conditioned the adoption of right-wing political ideologies and prejudiced attitudes. The shock and revulsion inspired by the holocaust played a major role in precipitating this shift. As Milner (1981) points out: 'the very obscenity of the holocaust connoted a kind of mass pathology, a collective madness. Explanations were therefore sought in the disturbed personality, for it was hardly conceivable that these could be the actions of normal men' (p. 106).

Prejudice was therefore seen as the expression of an inner need that was characteristic of a particular kind of disturbed personality. This meshed with the well-established finding that prejudice was a generalized characteristic of individuals (Allport, 1954). Thus, persons who were anti-Semitic would be more likely to be anti-Black or, for that matter, less favorable towards any minority or outgroup. Consequently, the crucial social scientific question became that of identifying and describing the personality structures and characteristics making individuals likely to adopt authoritarian ideologies and prone to prejudice and ethnocentrism.

The most influential answer to this question was the theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, et al., 1950). This described a personality dimension determining the degree to which individuals would be prone to adopt right-wing ideologies and prejudiced attitudes. Such personalities were formed by harsh, punitive parenting within authoritarian families, which were in turn reinforced by repressive, authoritarian socio-political milieus and ideologies. This theory was partly formulated in psychodynamic terms, but other approaches to the same issue were not, such as Rokeach's dogmatism (Rokeach, Smith, & Evans, 1960).

The dominant paradigm during this period was therefore not psychodynamic *per se*, but an individual differences orientation to the explanation of prejudice. Fairchild and Gurin (1978) have argued that this individual difference perspective was well suited to the spirit of postwar America. The war had been won. The national mood was one of optimism, commitment to superordinate goals, and faith in democracy. Consequently, they suggested, there tended to be little inclination to question the social system or look to institutional explanations of prejudice and discrimination.

The social policy implications of the approach were optimistic. If authoritarian personalities were produced by punitive, repressive authoritarian families and societies, then the spread of political democracy and liberal values would gradually but systematically eliminate the social and familial structures producing such personalities. Thus, social progress would result in the defeat of authoritarianism in all its forms and its replacement by liberal and democratic values and government. This would be associated with the progressive growth of political and racial tolerance. During the 1960s, however, the critical question about prejudice confronting social scientists in America changed, and produced a very different approach to prejudice.

THE 1960S AND 1970S: CULTURE AND SOCIETY

At the end of the 1950s the emphasis in explaining prejudice moved away from individual psychological factors to social and cultural influences (Ashmore & DelBoca, 1981). This socio-cultural perspective seems to have been dominant during the 1960s and 1970s and, in the latter decade particularly, tended to be associated with a decline of interest in specifically psychological explanations of prejudice in favor of more sociological ones. It has been suggested that two distinct

phases can be distinguished within this period (e.g., Ashmore & DelBoca, 1981). These seem to represent different responses to the distinctive historical contexts and explanatory problems of American race relations, first in the 1960s, when the emphasis was on normative influence, and then in the 1970s, when the emphasis shifted to intergroup conflicts of interest. Ashmore and DelBoca (1981) have described these as consensus and conflict versions of the socio-cultural perspective on prejudice.

The shift away from an individual differences paradigm could be attributed to the inability of this approach to account for the high levels of prejudice in social settings such as the American South or South Africa, as Pettigrew's (1958, 1959) research so clearly demonstrated. However, prior research had also revealed these limitations, if not quite as clearly, before this shift in perspective occurred (e.g., Minard, 1952; Prothro, 1952). The historical circumstance that may have been instrumental in precipitating the shift in perspective seems likely to have been that the civil rights campaign in the American South, which exploded into public awareness in the late 1950s making salient the social problem of institutionalized racism and segregation there (Blackwell, 1982).

Prejudice in the American South could not be plausibly explained as an expression of underlying pathology or in terms of individual difference constructs. Pettigrew's (1958) classic research confirmed this by showing that the high levels of racial prejudice in South Africa and the American South were not due to persons from these societies being higher in authoritarianism. It seemed that in such settings an entire society was racist, and so was the 'good citizen' (Ashmore & DelBoca, 1981: 23). This focused attention on the normative character of prejudice in highly prejudiced societies specifically, and also by extension, in all settings where prejudice was socially widespread.

The dominant image of prejudice was therefore that of a norm embedded in the social environment, which suggested that prejudice might be substantially explained in terms of socialization in, and conformity to, traditional norms and institutionalized patterns of interracial behavior and segregation (e.g., Proshansky, 1966; Westie, 1964). This normative approach to prejudice tended to suggest a basically optimistic view of the future of race relations. There tended to be a widespread assumption that the 'problem' South could become like the 'liberal' North by legally abolishing segregation, discrimination, and institutionalized barriers to contact, and desegregating schools and workplaces and that these measures in themselves would be sufficient to erode and ultimately eliminate racism. Fairchild and Gurin (1978) have characterized this point of view as a 'consensus model' of race relations, which took racial integration as its primary goal and largely ignored issues of conflict, power, inequality and dominance relations.

They suggest that this perspective was widely held until the mid-1960s. At that time these optimistic assumptions became increasingly untenable with the urban revolts of the mid-to-late 1960s and the hardening of resistance to the civil rights movement as its targets changed from integration in public accommodations to voting rights, jobs, and income inequalities (Fairchild & Gurin, 1978). Bowser (1985) argues also that it then became increasingly evident that the problem of race relations in the United States was not just one of Southern prejudice and institutionally entrenched segregation. The informal and more covert pattern of racial segregation and dominance of the industrial and urban North was left virtually untouched by the civil rights movement and the 1964 Civil Rights Bill and began to gradually replace the overt and internationally embarrassing caste system in the South.

Racism and discrimination, it seemed, were far more deeply rooted in American society. Socially shared and normative patterns of prejudice and discrimination could no longer be viewed as just cultural and institutional traditions characteristic of the South. As the institutionalized segregation and old-fashioned racism of the South disappeared, it seemed to be replaced by informal discrimination and segregation, and the subtle 'modern' racism of the North. The paradigm that emerged saw racism and discrimination as being rooted in the power relations between Whites and Blacks in American society as a whole. The question that therefore became particularly salient during the 1970s – the second phase of this period of socio-cultural emphasis – was that of identifying and explaining the intergroup conflicts of interest and structural power relations that maintained racism and discrimination in America.

Answers to this question were proposed in terms of factors such as internal colonialism (Blauner, 1972), a split labor market (Bonacich, 1972), institutionalized racism (Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967), and the socio-economic advantages for Whites of maintaining a stable Black underclass (Thurow, 1969). The new paradigm of the 1970s therefore viewed racial prejudice as expressing the interests of the dominant White group, which were served by the maintenance of racial inequality and keeping Blacks as a disadvantaged, powerless, and impoverished underclass. White American racism was seen as a direct expression of elite group self-interest and the desire to maintain historic privilege (Bowser, 1985).

With this shift in the dominant understanding of racial prejudice in America came a shift in the social policies favored to reduce prejudice. To eliminate racism, the social, economic, and political inequalities between Blacks and Whites would have to be changed, most notably through affirmative action and the political empowerment of Blacks in American society (Crosby, 2004). For a time affirmative action policies were implemented, and although they led to undeniable advances in Black empowerment and the growth of a Black middle class, they were largely abandoned by the conservative administrations of the 1990s. By this time, however, a new shift had occurred in the way in which prejudice was conceptualised and explained that led to an emphasis on new and somewhat different policies to reduce prejudice.

THE 1980S AND 1990S: THE COGNITIVE APPROACH

During the 1970s and 1980s important research findings suggested that the persistence and pervasiveness of prejudice might not just be due to group interests, power relations, and social structure, but involved other, perhaps more fundamental psychological processes. Research in the United States suggested that racism had not declined, but merely changed its form. These findings indicated that despite survey evidence of sharp declines in Whites' racial prejudice from about 1960, discriminatory behavior and racial inequality had not decreased correspondingly (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980), and many ostensibly nonprejudiced Whites opposed policies to reduce these inequalities (Huddy & Sears, 1995). Research also indicated that Whites' overtly friendly behavior to Blacks or apparently nonprejudiced questionnaire responses could be accompanied by covert negative affect revealed by subtle indicators such as voice tone and seating distance, or detected using the bogus pipeline technique (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Overall, these findings suggested that the traditional or old-fashioned American racism characterized by beliefs in Black biological inferiority, White supremacy, and support for segregationist and discriminatory practices had merely been supplanted by a new, more subtle, and socially acceptable form of racism.

There have been several different conceptualizations of this new racism, such as symbolic or modern racism (McConahay & Hough, 1976), racial resentment (Kinder & Sanders, 1996), and subtle prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Similar perspectives have emphasized ambivalence in White American racial attitudes (Katz & Hass, 1988), and the concept of aversive racism, which suggests that most Whites hold superficially egalitarian beliefs and a nonprejudiced self-image at

a conscious level together with underlying covert negative feelings to Blacks (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).

These findings have also led to research distinguishing explicit and implicit stereotyping and prejudice (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Explicit measures of prejudice and stereotyping, such as measures of modern or symbolic racism, operate at a conscious level, while implicit measures are assumed to operate in an unconscious and automatic fashion. A variety of implicit measures have been used with the most common being measures of response latency for the activation of positive or negative stereotypes following category priming and variations of that procedure, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).

While these implicit measures have tended to be only weakly associated with measures of explicit racism, there is evidence that they are more strongly related to people's spontaneous and automatic responses to Blacks than are explicit prejudice measures Blacks (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, et al., 1996). Whites have also shown markedly greater negativity to Blacks on implicit measures than they do on explicit measures (Fazio & Olson, 2003). In general, therefore, findings using measures of implicit racism supported the conclusion from research using subtle measures of explicit prejudice that White American racism remained a major social problem.

At the same time that research was establishing that racism, albeit in newer and more subtle forms, was still pervasive in American society, important findings also emerged from research in Europe using minimal groups. In this research, individuals were divided into groups on an essentially arbitrary basis with no contact or interaction between groups and no conflict of interest or realistic basis for antagonism. Yet the members of these minimal groups still showed bias, discrimination, and a competitive orientation in favor of the ingroup against the outgroup. These findings seemed to have fundamental implications, suggesting that the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups, that is, social categorization *per se*, seemed to be sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Intergroup bias and discrimination were therefore seen as inevitable outcomes of a normal, natural, and universal cognitive process that functioned to simplify the complexity of the social world (Hamilton, 1981a). This seemed to explain why prejudice and discrimination were such ubiquitous, intractable, and almost universal social phenomena. It provided a new, powerful, and distinctively psychological perspective for understanding important social problems, such as the persistence of racism in America and an upsurge of neo-fascism, anti-Semitism, and anti-immigrant sentiment in Western Europe in the 1970s.

Two broad approaches to the issue of how basic cognitive processes, such as categorization, influence prejudice and discrimination could be distinguished: a pure cognitive approach, and a cognitive-motivational approach. The pure cognitive approach focused on the concept of stereotype as a cognitive structure directly determined by categorization that organizes and represents information about social categories. This social-cognitive perspective generated a great deal of experimental research, much of which has investigated the role of cognitive structures, such as stereotypes, in biasing information processing and social behavior, particularly discriminatory behavior (e.g., Hamilton, 1981a). It was widely accepted that much of prejudice and discrimination can be accounted for in such terms.

The second cognitive-motivational approach also assumed that cognitive factors were primary, but viewed social categorization as triggering a basic motivational process to evaluate one's ingroup positively relative to outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The research emerging from this cognitive-motivational approach has also been predominantly experimental, and has mostly focused on testing predictions from social identity theory (SIT) concerning effects on ingroup bias, favoritism, and discrimination in either minimal or real intergroup situations

(Brown, 2000; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). The social-cognitive and cognitive-motivational perspectives were the dominant psychological approaches to explaining and understanding prejudice and intergroup relations during the last two decades of the twentieth century.

This new paradigm seemed to have important implications for reducing prejudice. Previously, policies to reduce prejudice had often been interpreted or implemented in ways consistent with the assimilationist assumptions that reducing the salience of group and racial differences and making society colorblind would reduce and ultimately eliminate racism and prejudice. The new cognitive paradigm helped to show that assimilationist and colorblind policies would disadvantage minorities by reinforcing an intolerant attitude to cultural and group differences and so maintain covert prejudice and discrimination against them (e.g., Schofield, 1986). It also emphasized the inevitability of group differentiation and the importance, particularly for minorities, of maintaining positively valued and differentiated group identities (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Hewstone & Brown, 1986). During the 1980s and 1990s multiculturalism, therefore, became the dominant approach to prejudice reduction espoused by social scientists.

During the past decade, however, significant limitations of the social-cognitive and cognitive-motivational approaches to understanding prejudice have become apparent, suggesting that a new paradigm shift may be underway. Most of these limitations have not emerged recently but had been apparent right from the very beginning of the cognitive paradigm, supporting the view that these paradigm shifts have been driven primarily by changes in social zeitgeist rather than by theoretical or empirical considerations. For example, a major limitation of the cognitive perspective has been its neglect of motivational and affective factors, or in the case of the cognitive-motivational perspective, its relegation of affective and motivational factors to a secondary role (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Smith & Mackie, 2005). Yet, this concern was not new. Two and a half decades ago, Hamilton (1981b) had concluded an influential edited volume on the cognitive approach by acknowledging that 'if there is any domain of human interaction that history tells us is laden with strong, even passionate, feelings, it is in the area of intergroup relations' (p. 347). He, therefore, concluded that the cognitive approach, despite the advances that it had made, was by itself incomplete.

A second limitation of the cognitive perspective, and in particular of the cognitive-motivational approach, is that it was never clear that the kind of bias and favoritism observed in minimal intergroup situations was the same as the intergroup prejudice and hostility observed in natural social contexts. Most research evidence indicates that the bias in minimal intergroup situations reflects ingroup favoritism rather than outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1999; Brown, 2000). These findings suggest that this ingroup bias may be only a precursor that is elaborated into prejudice under particular social conditions. Again, this limitation was not recent; it was cogently noted by Brewer (1979) in her early and influential review of minimal intergroup research and the social identity approach.

The cognitive approach has also not fared well in empirical research on prejudice. Park and Judd (2005) reviewed 40 years of research and concluded that social categorization has little influence on intergroup animosity. Research on cognitive-motivational approaches, such as SIT, has also not fared well. The core propositions of this approach concerning the role of self-esteem maintenance and enhancement as the underlying motivation generating intergroup bias, or that group identification should be a powerful predictor of intergroup prejudice, have not been supported (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Brown, 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Findings relating group identification to prejudice have at best suggested that only specific kinds of group identification might interact with more fundamental causal variables, such as intergroup threat, to cause prejudice under certain conditions (see Brown, 2000;

Duckitt, Callaghan, & Wagner, 2005; Gibson, 2006; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001). Research testing the core prediction from SIT that low intergroup distinctiveness would be a primary driver of the degree to which a group would differentiate itself from relevant comparison groups has found no such effect overall, and only a very weak, effectively trivial effect ($r = 0.04$) for highly identified members of such groups (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004).

Finally, and most tellingly, when research on prejudice in naturalistic social conditions has compared the predictive power of predictions from SIT against predictions from Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT), the latter have invariably shown greater explanatory power than the former (e.g., Brown, 2000; Gibson, 2006; Shamir & Sagiv-Schiffer, 2006). Once again, this was not a new finding. Research reported as early as 1978 by van Knippenberg had demonstrated this, so that Tajfel and Turner (1979), in one of their first systematic expositions of SIT, were compelled to acknowledge that SIT was not intended to replace RCT, but only to supplement it.

While inconclusive, weak, and inconsistent research findings were accumulating about the link between cognitive and cognitive-motivational processes and prejudice, concerns were also beginning to be voiced about the effectiveness of multiculturalism as a social policy to reduce prejudice. It has been noted that the way in which multicultural policies have been implemented might create or reinforce barriers to contact that would impede the development of more positive intergroup attitudes (e.g., Brewer, 1999). These concerns have been strengthened by new research showing how potent interpersonal contact and friendship across group boundaries under decategorized conditions can be in reducing prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; see also, Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

To sum up, it became apparent during the 1970s that despite dramatic social changes and new norms against prejudice, racism persisted, though in a more subtle, symbolic, or even implicit forms. It seemed that the intractability and persistence of racism in America might involve more fundamental factors than social structure and group interests. Thus, explanations for prejudice were formulated in terms of basic, universal, and essentially normal cognitive processes, such as social categorization and group identification. After several decades, however, serious doubts have emerged about the capacity of this paradigm to provide clear and empirically supported explanations for prejudice, together with this a growing awareness of the pitfalls of simplistically applying the multicultural social policies associated with it.

POST 2000 – A NEW PARADIGM? AFFECT, MOTIVATION, AND THE COMPLEXITY OF PREJUDICE

The cognitive approach focusing on universally pervasive, though generally mild, intergroup biases and stereotyping had seemed to answer the questions that were most salient for social scientists during the last few decades of the twentieth century, that is, explaining the persistence and pervasiveness of racial stereotyping and subtle or implicit racial biases and discrimination. With the new millennium, however, important changes in the historical context have begun to make different questions about prejudice, and different kinds of prejudice, salient for social scientists. These new questions were ones the cognitive approach could not answer adequately.

Thus, the cognitive approach has shown little relevance for explaining the intense, passionate, ideologically grounded ethnocentric group loyalties, and extreme intergroup animosities that have risen to the fore internationally following the collapse of the relatively stable bipolar world order that existed up to the 1990s. Events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing 'wars on terror' have shifted attention to different questions about prejudice. The emphasis, which for so long was on White racism in the United States as the prototypal prejudice, has now begun to broaden and encompass the affectively intense, ideologically and motivationally driven intergroup hatreds and hostilities underlying broader intergroup conflicts that threaten global security.

These new issues seem to signal the emergence of a new paradigm for understanding prejudice. Although the shape of this new paradigm is not yet entirely clear, a number of theories of prejudice have become prominent that respond to these new issues, and share important themes. In particular, they tend to see prejudice as complex and multifaceted, as primarily affective, as motivationally driven and rooted in ideological beliefs, and as powerfully influenced by both individual differences and by intergroup social and power relations, particularly involving threat, competition, and inequality.

The complexity of prejudice became increasingly apparent as it became evident that the new and implicit racisms had not simply replaced older, traditional, and explicit prejudices, but that both new and old, implicit and explicit, were different and equally important manifestations of prejudice and discrimination that all required explanation (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995;Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Evidence from the emerging area of the social cognitive neuroscience of prejudice confirms this by showing neural differences between Whites' automatic or implicit responses to Black faces and their more controlled responses, with the latter more controlled responses able to modulate the more automatic neural responses (Cunningham, Johnson, Raye, et al., 2004).

Further developments have also shown that explicit prejudice itself may have different expressions. For example, Glick and Fiske (2001) have shown how three distinct kinds of explicit prejudice (paternalistic, contemptuous, and envious) with different affective expressions (pity, envy, and contempt, respectively) are generated by different combinations of the two stereotype dimensions of warmth and competence. Further research deriving from threat-based theories of intergroup attitudes has shown that different kinds of outgroup threat or relations between groups will produce qualitatively different patterns of prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Esses & Dovidio, 2002; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Stephan & Stephan, 2000).

During the same period, researchers also began to rediscover a view of prejudice as intrinsically affective in nature. In 1993, Mackie and Hamilton edited an important volume on the role of affect in intergroup relations. In the following decade new theories have emerged focusing explicitly on prejudice as affective, such as intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, et al., 2002), and Cottrell and Neuberg's (2005) socio-functional approach. Empirical findings have indicated that affective responses to outgroups were markedly better predictors of overall outgroup evaluation or discrimination than were stereotypes (e.g., Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, et al., 1996). In addition, an important new meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) showed that intergroup contact does seem to play a vital role in reducing prejudice, and suggested that contact involving positive affect (such as close friendships) might be particularly significant in this respect.

The new emphasis on prejudice as complex and primarily affective also involved a view of prejudice as motivationally based. Thus, theories focusing on intergroup relations of threat, competition, or inequality have viewed prejudice as a motivated affective response. Intergroup threat theories presuppose that perceived threat from outgroups causes reactive hostility to those groups by activating motives to manage, control, or reduce threat, uncertainty or insecurity. The specific kind of outgroup threat can vary. Terror Management theory emphasizes outgroup threat to worldview beliefs (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997), evolutionary theories have emphasized how prejudiced attitudes constitute adaptive responses, to various kinds of outgroup threats, that

have survival value for groups (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Kurzban & Leary, 2001), and Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) provides a taxonomy of the different kinds of outgroup threat that elicit prejudice.

A second basic human motive that has been central to intergroup theories of prejudice is that of power, dominance, or more generally, enhancement motivation. Social dominance theory, for example, sees the motive for group-based dominance as fundamental to the establishment of social hierarchies, and discrimination and prejudice aimed at maintaining social inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). System justification theory proposes that prejudiced attitudes and negative stereotypes of low-status groups derive from the motive to justify and legitimize unequal social systems, even among those disadvantaged by the inequality (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

Intergroup theories focusing on competition between groups have involved both threat and dominance as motives for prejudice. Intergroup competition would activate the desire to win, and therefore motives for dominance and superiority as well as a fear of losing, and therefore threats of loss or harm. Sherif's (1967) Realistic Conflict Theory, for example, was originally seen as arousing intergroup hostility through activating motivated desires to win a sporting competition and establish superiority over a competing group, but later also seen as causing prejudice through competitively generated threats of harm or loss (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Intergroup competition involving both threat and dominance motives also seems central to the Instrumental Model of Group Conflict (Esses, Jackson, Dovidio, et al., 2005) and the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, et al., 2002). Social Identity Theory sees competitive desires to establish and maintain the evaluative superiority of one's ingroup as an important motive for intergroup bias and discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Finally, Group Position Theory also involves both motives for dominance and response to perceived threat in seeing prejudice as the response of a dominant social group to outgroups seen as encroaching on or challenging its dominant position (Bobo, 1999).

Individual difference explanations of prejudice have also been interpreted in similar motivational terms. Research has shown that two individual difference dimensions, Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), powerfully predict the prejudiced attitudes of individuals (Altemeyer, 1981; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). While these dimensions, and particularly RWA, were originally seen as personality dimensions, they have more recently been interpreted as ideological social attitude dimensions that express basic motivational goals or values. RWA expresses the need for societal or group security, order, or harmony, and SDO the desire for group power or dominance (Duckitt, 2001; Stangor and Leary, 2006). Research has supported this motivational approach by showing that the effects of RWA and SDO on prejudiced attitudes were indeed mediated by perceived outgroup threat and by competitiveness over relative dominance, respectively (Duckitt, 2006).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Overall, therefore, important changes seem to have been occurring in the way social scientists have understood and studied prejudice during the first decade of the twenty-first century. While these changes have been influenced by research, they may, perhaps more fundamentally, reflect important social developments during the past decade. As a result, the emphasis now seems to be shifting away from seeing prejudice in fundamentally cognitive terms, generated almost automatically by the basic cognitive process of categorization. Instead prejudice seems to be increasingly viewed as a much more complex and multidimensional construct, affective in nature, and expressing basic human motives activated by particular social and intergroup conditions. It may well be

these social and motivational processes that elaborate relatively mild stereotypes and biases that are automatically elicited by salient social categorizations and identities into the more virulent manifestations of prejudice and discrimination. This new paradigm would thus retain a role for cognitive processes such as categorization and identification, but in an essentially secondary role – as necessary conditions for prejudice, or precursors of it.

At present these new emphases characterize a number of theories, which have different foci, but also important complementarities. The most important task for theory and research in this new era may be to elucidate these complementarities in order to develop the kind of integrative theoretical frameworks that may be needed to provide a more complete and comprehensive understanding of a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Together with this development may come more sophisticated approaches to interventions to reduce prejudice and discrimination. Recognition of the complexity of prejudice should bring the development of broader and more flexible intervention programs that will incorporate those particular prejudice-reduction strategies that are specifically targeted at particular kinds of prejudice and their different social and motivational bases.

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