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Post-War Europe

What's in a Name?

The Macedonian Question

To an outsider, the following seems breathtakingly absurd: relations between the Balkan nations of Greece and Macedonia have been defined by conflict for two decades, because the latter's constitutional name is 'Republic of Macedonia'. As a result of that, the small landlocked state with a population of just over two million, has been unable to join its post-Communist neighbours in accessing NATO and the European Union. The Hellenes refuse to allow the former Yugoslav republic to do so, unless the term 'Macedonia' is removed from its name. Although negotiations between the two parties have taken place for almost 20 years now, no compromise was reached. Currently, the situation has reached an impasse. This inevitably poses the question, why no middle ground could be established. This essay will put forward the argument, that both sides use historical aspects of the naming dispute for the purpose of nation-building. Using history for the creation and further consolidation of identity is an idea that has been discussed by numerous academics, and it will be argued that the naming dispute between Greece and Macedonia can be regarded as a critical case in an evaluation of the applicability of this idea. Firstly, the theoretical framework behind the processes of state and nation-building will be reflected on. The relationship between nations, Nationalism, states and history will be shown. Then the naming dispute will be presented as the case-study underlying the principal argument. The use of history by both Greece and Macedonia will be highlighted, and finally the role of external actors, particularly the EU, NATO and the UN, will be assessed. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn based in the findings presented here.

Theoretical Perspective on State and Nation-building

History has shown that both states and nations are not rigid entities, but that they are constructed and sometimes even reconstructed. In order give an analysis of the processes of state

and nation building, the most important concepts will firstly be described and defined. Afterwards, a theoretical framework that will be used throughout the paper will be established. Finally, the theoretical approach to the processes of state and nation building will be ascertained. A special focus will hereby be devoted to the use of history for political purposes.

Definitions

Although state and national-building have been researched before, scholars have no consensus on the definition of the central concepts of 'state' and 'nation'. As Schulze argues, states are a relatively new phenomenon (Schulze, 1996, p.6). Definitions of 'state' are clearly linked to the interests of those defining. This becomes clear when one analyses on the one hand legal definitions and on the other hand historical sociological definitions (Koch, 1993, p.13). In the light of the research conducted here, the definition given by Strayer is useful, since it allows for the differentiation of government and nation. Strayer argues that a state is characterized by a "centralized political entity over a specified territory with both internal and external sovereignty" (ibid, p.13-14). A central element of a state is thus its territory.

This also marks the difference to the concept of 'nation'. Whereas 'state' refers to a territory, 'nation' refers to people. A common definition of a nation is provided by Benedict Anderson. Anderson defines a nation as "an imagined political community imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991, p.6). Striking about this definition is the fact that it refers to 'construction'. Imagination implies that it is a fictional construction. When discussing the concept of a nation this is in fact true, since there is no nation in which everybody knows everyone. A nation according to Anderson is imagined; it did not come into existence by itself; it is *constructed* with a purpose. In order to investigate the process of nation-building we must therefore look at its purpose. Gellner's observation is correct in this perspective when he links the creation of nations to Nationalism (GELLNER, SOURCE). This purpose-role of Nationalism will be elaborated on later.

A nation according to Anderson is "inherently limited and sovereign." These notions refer to the fact that there is no universal nation. At the same time, it is sovereign because of the fact that "the divine[ly] ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm" that existed before the enlightenment was rapidly losing ground when nations first came into existence (Anderson, 1991, p.7).

Theoretical framework

In our analysis of the use of history for political purposes in Greece and Macedonia, we will argue primarily along the lines of modernist theory. Jonathan Friedman distinguishes between a modernist and a post-modernist approach to research of history and identity, to which both state and nation formation are inevitably linked. While defining the central concepts we have seen that nation are social constructs. A motivation for the creation of statehood is the urge to find evidence for a common identity.

In modernist theory this social constructivism is heavily emphasized. Hence, according to a modernist approach, history is merely a representation of a particular actor's interests. According to Friedmann, "Modernists try to debunk and demystify any accounts of history, in order to reach some kind of 'true' representation" (1992, p.850). Modernism "is a self-fashioned strategy of continuous development in which abstract rationality replaces all other more concrete foundations of human action" (ibid. p.847). In other words, history is used to legitimise the cause of a specific actor. Therefore, assuming that nations can be constructed – and therefore also re-constructed and de-constructed – this essay is based on constructivist theory. Constructivist theory in relation to nation-building suggests that nations are not natural and that they are the result of human reasoning and human interests. One of the most prominent scholars reasoning from this perspective is Ernest Gellner. Gellner however, argues not only that nations are socially constructed, but perhaps more importantly that they are the result of modernity. This implies that especially Nationalism, which is perceived to be one of the most important driving forces behind the process of nation-building, only plays a role when certain criteria are met (Gellner, 2006, p.132). This idea will be given more attention later. Gellner's central idea is the "modernity of nations and Nationalism" (Özkirimli, 2000, p.85).

The second approach that Friedman recognizes towards the process of state and nation building is post-modernist theory. Post-modernist theory started off as a reaction to modernist theory. The post-modernist argument is quite relativistic, and rejects the notion of historical truths per se (Friedman, 1992, p.847). However we will use it marginally; post-modern theory thus finds its potential in that it is more flexible.

Lastly, it has to be stressed why we will not rely on neorealist theory in the analysis in this paper. Neorealist theory, despite being the predecessor and early rival of constructivist theory is hardly relevant here – it explains the logical behaviour of states rather than the processes that led to their existence.

Stages of State and Nation-Building

States have existed since as early as the middle ages. The difference however, between modern states and medieval states is the basis that they were built on. As Schulze points out, the core of medieval states was the personal bond between vassal and overlord (Schulze, 1996, p.7). In modern states on the other hand, this personal bond is replaced by institutions, making the core of the state centralized and institutionalized. It is in this perspective that the famous lines, 'the king is dead, long live the King', were formulated, since they mark a distinction between the king as a person and the King as an office. A king could die but his office – and the state – would live on (Schulze, 1996, p.9). The focus in this paper will be on the modern, institutionalized state. Processes of state and nation-building are different in most countries, and in this paper the use of history in these processes will be assessed. Hence different types of nation-building will be emphasised. Firstly, the different stages of nation-building will be discussed. Gellner's modernist theory will serve as a starting point. Gellner's main point, that nations and Nationalism are socially constructed *and* that they are the result of modernity, implies that specific criteria have to be met before we can really speak about a nation. From this theory we can identify three distinct phases that led to a situation in which these criteria are met: a situation that Gellner describes as the 'age of Nationalism' (Gellner, 2006, p.54).

The first 'stage' is a situation in which states do not exist. In the process of nation-building this stage is relatively uninteresting since boundaries do not exist and sovereignty is not relevant. In this situation – which can be found in early hunter-gatherer societies – power structures are relatively horizontal. More interesting is the second stage; the stage of the agrarian society. It is in this type of society that possesses a literate elite. As Gellner argues, "literacy, the establishment of a reasonable permanent and standardized script, means in effect the possibility of cultural and cognitive storage and centralization" (Gellner, 2006, p.9). In other words, the foundation is laid for a centralized perception of culture, even though centralized here only refers to a small elite. In the third stage, the stage of the 'industrialized society', this culture is not limited to the elite. In other words a vertical power structure develops which is unified by culture. It is this society that for the first time is focused on growth (ibid. p.23; 28). Gellner explains:

> "The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and nation *must* now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose and often minimal. Now it is unavoidable. That is what Nationalism is all about and why we live in the age of Nationalism" (Ibid. p.37).

In other words, the changing modernist society provides conditions in which processes of Nationalism and nation-building can take place. In this last phase nations are constructed or 'invented'. We will elaborate on Nationalism and the importance of high-culture in the next part.

Nationalism

Most authors agree that processes of Nationalism play a very important role in processes of nation-building. They explicitly do not agree however, on a single definition of Nationalism. This is exactly the reason that Nationalism – despite being very important – is left out of the 'definitions' section of this paper. There is no single definition possible that covers all areas related to the concept of Nationalism. Nationalism can refer to "ideas, to sentiments and to actions" (Özkirimli, 2000, p.58). When focusing on history, one can see that all three are important and that a single definition is not desirable. One should however realize that different explanations of the concept exist and that thus the focus should lie on a broad understanding of 'Nationalism'. This should include both the concepts of an "ideological movement" and of a "political movement" referring to respectively Smith and Gellner (Smith, 2004, p.245; Gellner, 2006, p.1).

Discussing the process of nation-building, according to modernist theory, can only be done in the context of the 'age of Nationalism'. Hence, the 'age of Nationalism' refers to a situation defined by "centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just minorities" as the primary basis of identity (Gellner, 2006, p. 54). In relation to the different stages of nation-building, this would thus be the industrialist, modern stage. The concept of high cultures to which is referred to here, relates to a "mass, public, literate, specialized and academically-supervised culture, preferable in a specific language which allows context-free communication" (Smith, 2004, p.66). High culture can therefore be perceived as the basis of modern societies. In conclusion, according to Gellner, it is only in this modern age that nations as we define them in this paper can be distinguished.

According to Gellner, Nationalism implies that state and nation are destined for each other, "that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy." Nationalism thus leads to the creation of nations. In Gellner's words, Nationalism "invents nations where they do not exist, - but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if […] these are purely negative" (Gellner in: Smith, 2004, p.66). These 'pre-existing, differentiating marks' are necessarily to be found in history. History is of central importance in Nationalist theories because

it is the primary means of highlighting common culture. This common culture is not exclusive to Gellner's interpretation of Nationalism as a political movement. Most authors recognize Nationalism as a force that evokes change. History *always* plays an important role here, since it provides historical 'evidence' for the existence of the nations which Nationalist movements identify themselves with.

Identity

Nationalist's movements identify themselves with a specific nation or even with a group of people which they believe should be a nation. They can thus even contribute to the process of creation of a nation if is not pre-existent. Hobsbawm underlines, this stating that "Nationalism comes before nations," and that "nations do not make states and Nationalisms but the other way round" (Özkirimli, 2000, p. 86). In line with constructivist theory, created nations need to be legitimized in order to create a bond between people. According to Anderson, an invented community needs roots in order to belong to an 'invented community' (Anderson, 1991, p.6). People identify themselves with people from this community using these roots which can be found in history. Constructivists and post-modernists argue that history can be used in such a way that common roots become factors that identify certain communities. Numerous factors play an important role in creating a common culture as the basis for a common culture. We will here briefly discuss two of these factors.

The first of these is a shared history. History can be used to create a connection between historical facts and nationality, even though this link is in reality very vague. An illustrating example is the statue of Chieftain Arminius in the Teutoburg Forest in Germany nicknamed 'Herman the German'. Arminius successfully fought against the Roman army around 20 AD in what is now Germany. The statue became a symbol of the greatness of the German people even though the link between 1870 Germany and the Germanic Chieftain was limited to the territory. Similar historical links can be found in contemporary Egypt with the supposed link of modern Egypt with ancient Egypt. The historian Eric Hobsbawm elaborates on this supposed connection with the past by underlining the importance of continuity whether it is real or not. He argues that both nations and Nationalism "are the product of 'social engineering'" and underlines the social constructivist approach by stressing the role of 'invented traditions' (Özkirimli, 2000, p. 116). These inventions he describes as "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and rituals of symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition which automatically implies continuity with the past" (ibid. p. 116).

A second important source for cultural identity is language. Language is a major component of culture and often relates to ones perception of the community he or she belongs to. Language acts as a common denominator between people, contributing to a feeling of community to its speakers. Since a language is spoken in a distinctive area it can also contribute to a geographical sense of community. In modern states recognition of language can play a role; distinction between dialects, regional and 'official' national languages can be made and all contribute to identity and a feeling of community. In the light of a process of nation building it can even be seen as a justification (Anderson, 1991, p. 315).

Given the link between shared history, symbolism and language, it is needless to say that education is one of the most important tools available to Nationalist movements. Hence, via educational channels a common culture and common identity can be underlined and reinforced.

Historical Background of the Macedonia Naming Dispute

After developing the theoretical framework, the focus will now lie on presenting the Macedonian Question as a critical case study of the theories outlined in the first section. In the social sciences, relying on a single case study is often deemed a somewhat controversial affair, as the phenomena described, in this case nation-building, are considered to be too complex to be assessed by relying on a single case. Nevertheless, sociologist Bent Flyvbjerg argues that under certain conditions, one may very well rely on a single case-study. One must be able to show, that the example at hand is a "*critical case*" that has "strategic importance in relation to the general problem" (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.219-45) The Macedonia naming dispute is such a critical case, because both the ideas of a Greek and a Macedonian nation are widely disputed. Friedmann states that "Greek identity seems to interest anthropologists of ethnic construction, because it is so clearly a recent construct whose continuity can be easily questioned" (1992, p.838). About Macedonia, a similar argument can be made. Fromkin blatantly asserts that "even as late as 1945, Slavic Macedonia had no national identity of its own" (1993, p.71). A conflict about history between these two nations, which are still in the process of developing their own national identities, is therefore an ideal case-study for an analysis of nation-building.

The Macedonia naming dispute refers to a disagreement between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia on the use of the stand-alone term 'Macedonia' as a name for the young Republic that became independent in 1991. The root of this dispute lies in the fact that 'Macedonia' also describes the northern province of Greece with its capital Thessaloniki. Greece claims that the term Macedonia refers to a strictly Greek identity and for this reason Greece is not willing to accept the stand-alone term 'Macedonia' for neighbouring Republic. To better understand and to gain more detailed insight on this dispute it is probably advantageous to give a historical overview of this conflict so that it can be understood and comprehended in a broader context. Moreover the historical background will eventually help to unveil some of the important facts that lead to this controversial dispute and to light up the reasons why this conflict still remains so important and why it wasn't settled until now.

To start with this overview we have to distinguish between Macedonia as a geographical unit and between Macedonia as a national identity with own territory and state. With the demise of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, Macedonia became important to the neighbouring regions. The creation of the hegemonies of Serbia and Montenegro and the kingdom of Greece lead to the rise of Nationalist movements within the Ottoman Empire specifically within these regions, which

were populated by Serbians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Romanians[1](Christodoulidis, 1997, p.277). The lack of relatedness to an independent or semi-independent national centre for the Bulgarian people was compensated by the establishment of a Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Exarchate), which became possible after pressure was put on the Ottoman Government by Russia, with her idea of "*pan-Slavism*"[2](ibid., p.278). The *firman* (decree) that created the Exarchate also determined which territories would fall under the control of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church[3](Tziampiris, 2000, p.40). This newly introduced condition lead to the weakening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which was responsible for the Christians within the Ottoman Empire, and which was independent of ethnicities until that time.

As a consequence, as Aristotle Tziampiris[4](ibid., 2000, p.40) states, the *firman* "initiated the struggle for Macedonia by religious, educational and eventually military means, between Bulgarians, Greeks and to a much lesser extent, Serbs." In 1876, a wave of uprisings went through the Balkans, including the territories populated by Bulgarians. These uprisings and especially the ones involving Bulgarian populations were crushed down brutally by the Ottomans[5](Christodoulidis, 1997, p.279). The Great Powers turned their attention to the Balkans, and after the conference of Constantinople in 1876 Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The following San Stefano Treaty in 1878 gave Bulgaria almost all of the Macedonian territories and practically helped Bulgaria to establish her aim of a Greater Bulgaria. In the same year, at the Congress of Berlin a revision of the San Stefano Treaty was announced, and Bulgaria had to return most of the previously gained territories to the Ottoman Empire[6](ibid, p.287).

Bulgaria's new policy was to try and influence the Macedonian territories by creating schools, and by setting up the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), whose task was to influence geographical Macedonia and to eventually to get militarily active within it.[7] Greece tried to counterbalance these actions by becoming more active in Macedonia itself, and by attempting to weaken Bulgarian activities.[8] Both sides let aside their differences as the Balkan states unified in the common goal of trying to overthrow the Ottomans during the First Balkan War (Tziampiris, 2000, p.41-42). Although the First Balkan War found the Balkan states victorious, the political distribution of the Macedonian territories remained a contested and

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[1] Theodoros Christodoulidis, *History of Diplomacy From Vienna to Versailles (Athens Sideris 1997) pp.277*
[2] *ibid pp. 278*
[3] Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question* (Ashgate Publishing Co. 2000) pp. 40
[4] *Ibid*
[5] Theodoros Christodoulidis, *History of Diplomacy From Vienna to Versailles (Athens Sideris 1997) pp. 279*
[6] *Ibid pp.287*
[7] Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question* (Ashgate Publishing Co. 2000) pp. 41
[8] *Ibid* pp. 42

controversial topic. The 1912 Treaty of London could not solve the disagreements between the different parties who fought together in the War (ibid.).[9] As a result, and because of Bulgaria's great disappointment regarding its territorial claims, the Second Balkan War broke out. Bulgaria attacked its former allies Greece and Serbia, but was not able to prevail and eventually lost the war. The Treaty of Bucharest that followed in August 1913 brought large parts of Macedonia in Greek and Serbian possession. Bulgaria even lost parts gained in the First Balkan War, a fact that was "undoubtedly disappointing for a state that had once encompassed a huge part of Macedonia, and had actively contested development in the region for more than four decades"[10](ibid., p.43). The First World War found Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers and again temporarily returned parts of Greek and Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria. After Germany's surrender however, Bulgaria lost these territories again.

The rise of Communism throughout the Balkans during the interwar period added a new facet to the Macedonian question. In 1924, during the fifth Comintern Congres,s a declaration was made stating for the first time that Macedonia should become independent including Greek Macedonia, Bulgarian Macedonia and Serbian Macedonia. The Greek Communist Party, KKE, agreed with Comintern's policy regarding Macedonia, a fact that lead to the KKE's loss of popularity in Greece[11](ibid., p.45).

The Second World War found pro-German Bulgaria regaining parts of Greek Macedonia and Thrace. The major resistance forces in Greece during World War II consisted of members of the KKE. The KKE created the EAM (National Liberation Front) and a military wing called ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army). It was the KKE that helped in establishing a Slav Macedonian Popular Liberation Front (SNOF) in order to recruit more volunteers[12](ibid, p.46).

The SNOF, combined with Tito's creation of the ASNOM (Anti-Fascist-Assembly of the National Liberation Front) and the declaration of a Socialist Macedonian Republic within Yugoslavia became problematic for Greece, because Tito's aim was not only to counterbalance Bulgaria's territorial claims but to further his influence in the Balkans by uniting all parts of Macedonia to a single autonomous entity[13](ibid.).

The outbreak of the Greek civil war complicated the Macedonian Question even more. The Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) and the KKE lacked volunteers and had to rely on Slav-

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[9] *Ibid*

[10] Aristotle Tziampiris, *Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question* (Ashgate Publishing Co. 2000) pp. 43

[11] *ibid* pp.45

[12] *ibid* pp.46

[13] *ibid* pp.46

Macedonians. Tito's NOF which consisted mainly from former SNOF members became a part of the DSE and fought for the Greek Communists during the Civil War. Because of this fact, and because of the Slav Macedonian help, the Greek Communist Party changed its policy towards Macedonia and supported a unification of Macedonia into a single entity (ibid., p.47).[14]Due to the victory of the Greek government forces during the Civil War these plans were never realized. As Evangelos Kofos[15](1999) mentions, "since the 1940s, '*Macedonism*' had been Yugoslav Macedonia's dominant nationalist ideology, aimed at 'mutating' its Slav (Bulgarians, Serbs, Moslems) and, to a certain extent, non-Slav (Vlachs, Greeks) segments of its population into ethnic 'Makedonci'. A full generation later, the experiment had proved successful to a considerable degree" (ibid.).[16]

Until the mid-1980s, the Macedonian Question remained a minor issue in Greece. It only surfaced when the Socialist Republic of Macedonia tried to gain recognition through a campaign promoting the idea of a Macedonian ethnicity, and of a Macedonian national heritage (ibid.).[17] In combination with the demise of Yugoslavia, this triggered discussions within the Greek public and political spheres, on how Macedonia would be named after it gains independence. Greek media introduced a new catchphrase especially in Greek Macedonia. It stated

(i.e. 'Macedonia is Greek') which became the slogan of 1992s Thessaloniki demonstration. Kofos (1996, pp.3) writes that "by utilizing that slogan, they had two things in mind: on the one hand, to set the record straight of the Hellenic connection of Ancient Macedonia, and in so doing to defend a people's collective right to its heritage, and, on the other hand, to voice in no uncertain terms a determination that the re-emergence of wartime irredentist yearnings for the annexation of Greek Macedonia would not be tolerated." This slogan was a response to irredentist sentiments in the Republic of Macedonia in 1989, who asked for a unification of Macedonia, including Greek Macedonian Territories[18] (ibid., p.4).

By using the phrase 'Macedonia is Greek', the Greek public become exposed to the idea that there can only be one Macedonia, neglecting the fact that Macedonia as a territory was part of Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia. This led to the Greek not-acceptance of any name that would contain the word Macedonia. As Kofos explains, even the word "'compromise' is still an

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[14] *ibid* pp. 47

[15] Kofos, Evangelos, "*Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy over FYROM's Independence and Recognition", Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades, Andre Gerolymatos, (New York, The Center for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Queens College of the City University of New York, and Pella Publishing Company, N.Y., 1999) Retrieved October 15th 2010 from http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/VirtualLibrary/index.html

[16] Ibid

[17] Ibid

[18] Ibid

ugly word in the Balkans, almost synonymous to treason," and treason is what a compromise solution remains in the eyes of the Greeks (Kofos, 1997, p.14).

After the Macedonian declaration of independence in 1991 the name dispute between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia became the main reason for diplomatic tensions between the two states. Greece succeeded in its diplomatic efforts regarding the recognition of the newly formed Republic in compliance with Greece's requirements. The first achievement took place on December 16, 1991, when the Council of Ministers of the European Community assembled and endorsed the Greek side's objections to the name 'Macedonia' and to possible Macedonian territorial claims [19](Floudas, p.4). The second and more obvious diplomatic success of the Greek government was at the European Council of Lisbon on June 27, 1992. The Community provisionally stated that it would recognize the newly-founded Republic, but only if it gave up the use of the word 'Macedonia' in its name[20](ibid). At that point Greece would have had the chance to negotiate a compromise regarding the name dispute, but due to internal tensions failed to do so[21](Kofos, 1997, p.7). Greek interests were actually rather neglected, because of the important role Macedonia began to play in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Macedonia "became a useful pawn in the unfolding international chess game of Great Power pacifiers vs. Balkan unruly villains" [22](ibid.). However, Greece's situation deteriorated even more when it imposed a trade embargo on Macedonia. The embargo was seen extremely negatively by the international community and threw a negative light on Greece.

In 1995 Greece and Macedonia signed a so-called interim accord, which lifted the embargo and instructed the Republic to change its flag and remove the Vergina Star. The name issue itself was postponed to 2002[23](ibid). FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) would provisionally become under which the Republic was admitted to the UN, until a solution would be found[24](Floudas, p.4).

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[19] Demetrius Andreas Floudas ,Pardon? A Conflict for a Name? FYROM'S DISPUTE WITH GREECE REVISITED, Retrieved October 5th 2010 from http://www.intersticeconsulting.com/documents/FYROM.pdf

[20] *Ibid*
[21] Kofos, Evangelos, "Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy over FYROM's Independence and Recognition", *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades, Andre Gerolymatos, (New York, The Center for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Queens College of the City University of New York, and Pella Publishing Company, N.Y., 1999) pp.361-394. Retrieved on October 15th from http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/VirtualLibrary/index.html

[22] *Ibid pp.7*
[23] Demetrius Andreas Floudas, Pardon?A Conflict for a Name? FYROM'S DISPUTE WITH GREECE REVISITED, Retrieved October 16th 2010 from http://www.intersticeconsulting.com/documents/FYROM.pdf

[24] ibid

In 2002 the 7-year interim accord expired and new efforts were made to settle the naming dispute. In this '7-year uneasy symbiosis'[25] as Evangelos Kofos (2003) calls the duration of the Interim Accord, the terms 'Republic of Macedonia' or just 'Macedonia' were gradually accepted by third countries who could not relate to the controversy of the issue. The name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was too complicated and uncomfortable in everyday use[26](Interview, Moraitis, 2010). The name 'Macedonia' became unofficially established.

The Use of History – Greece

Nikolaos Zahariadis[27] emphasises that Greece has no territorial claims on its neighbour, which poses the question why Greece is not willing to recognize its smaller neighbour under the name 'Republic of Macedonia' (1994, p.1). The Greek government believes, that Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia created Slav Macedonia by "mutation"[28](Kofos in Zachariadis, 1994, p. 6). In order to achieve that, it is assumed that three key elements had to be invented in order to create Macedonian identity: "a distinct language and church affiliation; an easily identifiable name; and a splendid history"[29] – all three were to a large extent accomplished (Zachariadis, 1994, p.6). Macedonia as a term supposedly suited the occasion because "as a regional and geographic designation the label was well known to the population and very suitable for speedy adoption"[30](ibid.).

Greeks have a very strong bond to their country's history and heritage. Macedonia as a name is so important to Greece because for Greeks as mentioned above, there is only one Macedonia and that Macedonia is Greek. To underline this perception for the purpose of strengthening national consciousness, reference is made for example to Herodotus, who quotes Alexander the Great as saying: "I am myself a Greek by descent, and I would not willingly see Greece exchange freedom for slavery" (2009).[31] Of course archaeological findings are sometimes

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[25] Kofos E. & Vlasidis V. (Eds.). (2003) *Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis (1995-2002)* Athens: Papazisis Publisher

[26] Interview with Lampros Moraitis, Former Diplomat for Greece (Athens, September 25th 2010)

[27] Nikolaos Zahariadis, Nationalism and Small State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue (Published in Political Science Quarterly, 109 (4) 1994, 647-668) retrieved October 20th 2010 from http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/VirtualLibrary/index.html

[28] Evangelos Kofos, The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1987).

[29] Nikolaos Zahariadis, *Nationalism and Small State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue* (Published in Political Science Quarterly, 109 (4) 1994 Retrieved October 12th October 2010 from http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/VirtualLibrary/index.html

[30] *Ibid*

[31] *Ibid*

presented, and references to language are also occasionally made, for the sake of the glorification of Hellenism[32](Interview, Moraitis, 2010). Greece fought over Macedonia during the two Balkan Wars as well as during the two World Wars. Moreover Greek Macedonia was severely affected by the Civil War, which highlights the traumatic bond that Greece has with Macedonia [33](Tziampiris, 2008, p.1).

After 1991 and the declaration of independence, the Republic of Macedonia is seen as having used several means to provoke Greece. Such provocations were for example the use of the Vergina Star in the Macedonian flag, or the use of the symbol of the white Tower on the Macedonian currency, which is the emblem of the City of Thessaloniki [34](Zachariadis, 1994, p.10-11). These examples shaped public opinion in Greece. The Greek public as well as Greek media started a marathon of reactions on the topic, unifying public opinion [35](Interview, Moraitis, 2010). History always played an important role for Greeks, but now with the emergence of a new state with a name identical to the province in northern Greece provoked dramatic reactions. It seemed as though Greek heritage was at stake, and thus it became the public's main priority regarding the foreign policy of the government. Of course media and public influenced the government itself. This meant that to avoid political costs the different parties had to create a policy towards 'FYROM', that would solve the dispute, but that would solve it in a manner, which would correspond with public opinion. The 'wrong' policy towards the settlement of the dispute would imply treason[36](ibid.).

History was often used in Greece as a means of nation-building, and to distract the public from internal problems. This applies to the naming dispute as well. Although the two main parties in Greece differ about nearly every policy aspect, foreign policy becomes somewhat of a uniting factor. In the case of the naming dispute, it unites the population under a common threat to identity. However the intense national feeling among Greek people cannot be denied and results in a more nationalistic way of handling foreign policy. The dispute thus not only shows how difficult it is to overlooks nationality and ethnicity, but also how aspects like a name can become so important. This is because names are related to identity, the creation of which is a crucial factor in nation-building. Moreover, the naming dispute exemplifies how a regional

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[32] Interview with Lampros Moraitis, Former Diplomat for Greece (Athens, September 25th 2010)
[33] *Ibid*
[34] Nikolaos Zahariadis, *Nationalism and Small State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue* (Published in Political Science Quarterly, 109 (4) 1994) Retrieved 12th October 2010 from http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/VirtualLibrary/index.html
[35] Interview with Lampros Moraitis,Former Diplomat for Greece(Athens, September 25th 2010)
[36] Ibid

dispute can, despite of the pressure applied by external players for settling this issue, persist and play an essential role in the national identity formation of a state. [37](Interview Moraitis, 2010).

The Use of History – Macedonia

The primary foreign policy objective of the Macedonian government is the integration of the Republic into NATO and the European Union (Government of Macedonia, 2009). This objective will not be met unless all member states of both institutions agree to the Balkan republics membership. The naming dispute is thus ultimately an existential threat to Macedonia's foreign policy. This was exemplified in 2008 when the Hellenic government used its veto to block Macedonia entry into NATO (Brabant, 2008). This section will outline the Macedonian perspective on the name issue, and how exactly the Macedonian government uses history to justify its claim to the name 'Macedonia'.

Macedon, Makedonski, Macedonia – Identifying Identity

The Macedonian Question has always been a question of identity, and it is by no means a post-Cold War question. As Fromkin (1993) poetically remarks, "Macedonia, like some jewel stolen from an Indian goddess or from a pharao's tomb, brought ruin to its possessors" (p.69). Since the 19th century, the geographical area of what is now the Republic of Macedonia was part of the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, and Serbia. All three have attempted unsuccessfully to superimpose an identity upon this mostly Slavic people, which spoke and still speaks a distinct south Slavic dialect, and which has now finally come to identify itself as Macedonian.

Macedonia is a name that most of us are very familiar with, and it is one of the few European regions that has been able to maintain its ancient name throughout the last two millennia. One reason for this interesting phenomenon is that ancient names, in this case Macedon, were often used to refer to geographical regions. Another major reason is that relatively little was known about Ottoman Macedonia until the 18th century. In 1709, a British topographer wrote of Macedonia: "It is Rich in divers Mines and Gold, abounds with Corn, Pasture, Cattle, Venison, and in some Parts Wine and Oyl" (Moll, 1709). This description was actually based on late Roman sources, and reveals the exotic and romanticised image West Europeans had in mind when thinking of Macedonia. In reality, the people of geographical

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[37] Interview with Lampros Moraitis,Former Diplomat for Greece(Athens, September 25th 2010)

Macedonia – that is the modern Republic of Macedonia and the Greek provinces – formed an "amalgam of cultures" (Wilkinson, 1952, p.393). There was no clear-cut Macedonian people, nor was there a Macedonian national identity. This was true to such an extent that, in classic French cuisine, a meal consisting of a random cut-up of vegetables and fruits, was called *macedoine* (Fromkin, 1993, p.69). However, this was a feature not unique to Macedonia. It was the Ottomans who often assigned national identities to the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula. Separating the Bulgarian Orthodox church from the Greek Orthodox church in the 1870s, sparked a nationalist sentiment in Bulgaria, which had previously had an affinity with Serbia. A few years later, the two countries found themselves at war with one another. Bulgarians, however, were united by a common language, and this was not the case for Macedonians. As ethnic composition maps from various sources from the early 1900s show, geographical Macedonia was inhabited mainly by Slavs, but also by large Greek, Albanian and Turkish minorities. By all accounts, Salonika which is modern Thessanoliki, was, at the beginning of the 20th century, a Slav city – a fact which will be paid more attention to in the course of this section. In 1895, the 'Macedo-Adrianople Committee' actually proposed setting up a Slav Macedonia with Salonika as its capital (Wilkinson, 1952, p.394). Although a distinct national identity was only developed with the rise of nationalism in the Balkans in general, historian R.G.D Laffan points out that as early as 1917 Slav Macedonians would, if asked for their nationality, reply with the word '*makedonski*' (1989, p.65). This was something unique to Slav Macedonians as Bulgarians, Greeks and Albanians would most likely identify with their respective nations.

The Macedonian language was regarded by Bulgarians as a dialect of Bulgarian (Fraser, 2002, p.351). Serb geographer Cvijić was instrumental in the disassociation of Macedonia from Bulgaria (Wilkinson, 1952, p.395). When Macedonia became part of Serbia, he convinced the Serb government that the 'Macedo-Slavs' had no national consciousness, and that they would naturally develop a Serb national identity once they were incorporated into Serbia. However, the distinctness of the Macedonian language actually produced the opposite effect. Perhaps Serbia was successful in disassociating Macedonians from Bulgaria, but Macedonians also saw that they did not belong with Serbia. This was particularly reinforced by an upsurge in Macedonian language literature – the Macedonian 'literary renascence' – which lasted until 1913. Writers like Krcuski, Puljevksi and Sapkarov contributed hugely to the purification of the Macedonian dialect which had become influenced by Bulgarian and Serbian (Wilkinson, 1952, p.395).

As previously discussed in earlier sections, after the 'population exchange' between Turkey and Greece, Lower Macedonia became ethnically Greek, and Upper Macedonia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which would later become Yugoslavia. After

WWII, Tito maximised his efforts to create a Macedonian national identity and to promote the Macedonian language (Wilkonson, 1952, p.395). The idea behind this was to further disassociate Macedonia from Bulgaria – a task that was never accomplished entirely successfully. Today, Slav Macedonians are eligible to apply to Bulgarian citizenship. So far there have been over 100,000 applications (Neofotistos, 2009, p.19).

The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia

The Republic of Macedonia finally became independent in 1991, and for the first time in over 2,000 years, there was an independent state carrying the name 'Macedonia'. Greece was never entirely happy with the name Macedonia, even when the young republic was still a constituent country of Yugoslavia, but now was the first time that the Hellenes could put pressure on their smaller neighbour to alter its constitutional name.

The original constitution of the Republic of Macedonia caused much controversy in the Greek government. Article 49 of the constitution states, that

> "the Republic cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries, as well as Macedonian expatriates, assists their cultural development, and promotes links with them" (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2010).

Greece saw this as a threat to its territorial integrity, and the constitution was amended to include the words: "The Republic of Macedonia has no territorial pretensions towards any neighbouring state" (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2010).

Although this was considered the most controversial part of the constitution, another part stands out for its explicit invocation of history. In the preamble, reference is made to the "historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom" (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2010). This is a very good example of the ideological use of history for nation-building. The constitution conveys the impression that the idea of a Slavo-Macedonian nation is an ancient idea, and that it is no different from the claims for other nations to their respective national identities. The Macedonian Foreign Minister underlines this, stating that Greece "uses this dispute as a pretext, to negate Macedonia's national and linguistic identity" (Milošoski, Schneider, 2010). This reinforces the idea that the Macedonian government highlights a long historical struggle of the Macedonian people for self-determination for nation-building purposes.

The constitution also makes reference to the Kruševo Republic, which was announced on Upper Macedonian territory in 1903 by the IMRO (Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Movement) (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2010). The IMRO was, however, neither a Macedonian nationalist organisation, nor a fully Slavic organization. Nevertheless, the Kruševo Republic was mythologised as the birthplace of modern Macedonia, and the "leaders of the rebellion became part of songs and national epics." For example, the Aromanian IMRO revolutionary Vlach Pito Guli was renamed 'Gulev', in order that his name sounds more Slavic (Opfer, 2005, p.29). The constitution makes a direct reference to this, which is a clear-cut example of the ideological use of history.

The Alexander Controversy

One rather controversial episode in Greco-Macedonian relations was caused by the renaming of Skopje International Airport after Alexander the Great – the legendary conqueror (BBC News, 2010). Macedonian foreign minister Milošoski defends this step, claiming that it was meant to honour Alexander, and that no nation should claim a monopoly over him. For this reason, Milošoski argued, Greece should be thankful to Macedonia for honouring a Greek in such a manner (Interview, 2009). Contrary to the Foreign Ministers promises of neutrality, the Macedonian government does indeed seem to use Alexander the Great to strengthen the population's nation identity. The national stadium of Macedonia was in 2009 renamed to 'Philip II Arena', after the king of ancient king of Macedon, who is also the father of the aforementioned Alexander the Great (Whitlock, 2009). Moreover, in 2009 Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski unveiled plans to construct a giant €10 million statue of Alexander the Great on his horse Bucephalus in the middle of Skopje. The step was highly controversial, not only because of the Greek protests it was likely to provoke, but also because of Macedonia's precarious financial situation at the time. Macedonia currently has to deal with 35% unemployment and an average income of just €315 per month and therefore even some of the established parties in the Republic critiques its construction. Bacatoros, Testorides, 2009). It is highly debatable whether the statue was a necessary investment.

Michael Freeden argues that "Nationalism is a rare instance of enlightenment-generated political thought that acknowledges the political importance of emotion" (1998, p.754). When seen through this lens, it becomes understandable why the Macedonian government would choose to create a connection between the modern Republic of Macedonia and the ancient Alexander the Great. He is an ideal object for the creation of a founding myth. Bell states that a myth is a "narrative that is most likely to include inter alia a story of the origins of a nation" (Bell,

2003, p.75). That is exactly what Alexander provides and the principal reason for the use of his name by the Macedonian government. This is thus another example for the ideological use of history for the purpose of nation-building.

Children of Greater Macedonia

In the early 2000s a TV broadcast shocked Greece: a Skaï news reporter interviewed children from a Macedonian school, asking them where exactly they think the borders of their country lie. The reported was dumbfounded when she heard them reply with the names of Greek cities and locations: Larisa, Mount Olympus and Chalcis (Interview, 2009). Indeed, the school books published in the 1990s contain references to the concept of a 'Greater Macedonia'. Although it was difficult to locate primary sources to prove this, it appears clear that "schoolbooks in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia consistently represent Macedonia as a region that consists of FYROM, the Greek administrative district of Macedonia and parts of other countries" (Tymphaios, 2009). Sometimes the modern borders are drawn on top of these maps, but at other times Macedonia simply appears as stretching from Thessaloniki to the Serbian border. To the Greek government and public, who dubbed this creation 'Greater Macedonia', this implied a territorial claim on Greece and triggered a huge controversy. After all, some parts of modern Slav Macedonia never belonged to ancient Macedonia – hence Macedonia is used on those maps not as a geographical but as a political term (Kofos, 2010). As school text books must be approved by their government before their release, it is safe to assume that this was a political move on the part of the Macedonian government.

Macedonia is not the only country in the Balkan region to have fostered the myth of a 'greater homeland'. Bulgarian, Albanian, Serb, and even Greek irredentists have argued for the annexation of territories historically belonging to their respective countries. Perhaps this is the key to explaining the Macedonian government's historiography. In a discussion about Greek irredentism, Kitromilides argues that Greek nationalism was spread in Pontos and Cyprus to infuse the two communities "with a sense of collective identity that broke their traditional isolation and insularity and cultivated their consciousness of partaking in the wider collective destiny" of Greece (1990, p.7). Although one cannot equate this with the situation of ethnic Slavo-Macedonian minorities abroad, the notion of a national 'collective destiny' can nevertheless also be applied to the Republic of Macedonia. Like its neighbours, Macedonia too intended to create for itself a mythical, glorious past and, as Kitromilides rightly points out, irredentism is a very strong catalyst of the creation of feelings of national consciousness. It may never have been

the official policy of the Macedonian government to establish a 'United Macedonia', as some Greek sensationalists claim. It may nevertheless have been Macedonia's intention to create yet another national myth in order to strengthen the population's national identity.

Concluding Remarks about the Macedonian Ideological Use of History

This section has shown that Macedonia is still in the process of fostering its national identity. Kitromilides also points out that that "the diachronic permanence of national characteristics" is a "necessary foundation of national identity," when looked at from a nationalist perspective (1990, p.3). The creation of a collective memory, and of a collective history, is necessary for nation-building. It may therefore be argued that it is in the interests of the Macedonian government to provoke Greece, and even to prolong the name dispute. Of course, Macedonia paid a high price for its policy: during the Greek blockade during the 1990s the country was practically cut off from international trade due to its inability to trade using the seaport of Thessaloniki. However, Macedonia managed to unite its people under a common idea, and under a common enemy, which are important prerequisites for nation-building. It is likely though, that even if a compromise is reached, Macedonia will continue to provoke the Greek government, as this generates widespread patriotic feelings amongst the general population.

The Role of External Actors in the Naming Dispute

Various international actors have greatly influenced the course of the debate surrounding the Macedonian question. International agencies have been a primary target of both Greece and Macedonia's politicizations of history. Both sides have looked to gain external backing for their versions of history and its modern application. At the same time, international players have sought to influence both nations' policies, at times very actively tempering their exploitation of history. Analysis of the Macedonia naming dispute would therefore be incomplete without an analysis of institutions outside of Greece and Macedonia. This paper will identify and analyse the role that the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) played in the Macedonian question in order to better comprehend Greece and Macedonia's political uses of history as well as understand how the issue arrived at its present day status.

At the first signs of the potential dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the European Community (EC) was largely preoccupied with the reconciliation of West and East Germany and its integration into the EC. The Community therefore turned to Greece, the Member State neighbouring Yugoslavia and, at least theoretically, deeply invested in the long-term stability of the region. Greece consistently and proactively supported the maintenance of Yugoslavia as a single state. Greece argued that if Yugoslavia dissolved into smaller states, resulting warfare would likely spill over into Greece. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the dissolution of Yugoslavia would reopen questions pertaining to Greek and Macedonian territory and culture (Economides, YEAR, p.479). In early 1992, when it became clear that Macedonia would become the next nation to break away from Yugoslavia, Greece began its offensive. The authors of *Media and Nationalism: the Macedonia Question*, summarize Greece in early 1992 as having a choice between following "a moderate and tolerant Nationalism," or "a tough ethnocentric Nationalistic line" and as having decidedly chosen the latter (Demertzis et al., YEAR, p.31). If the international community recognized this ethnically charged Nationalism in Greece, it did not make it known in 1992.

At these early stages of the conflict, international actors generally let Greece dictate the terms of conversation but made sure Macedonia became part of any negotiations. Consider, for example, the first meeting of EC Foreign Ministers following Macedonia's independence. At their May 1, 1992 (Correct Year?) meeting in Guimaraes, the Greek Foreign Minister presented his country's concerns over the "name conflict" and potential territorial crisis to the other Ministers. He also formally proposed the name "Republic of Skopje" for the newly independent nation. The Ministers were sympathetic to the security threats Greece highlighted as a consequence of territory disputes but did not share Greece's concern over the literal name of the nation. Moreover, the ministers from France and Italy opposed designating *any* name without a member of the nation in question present (Tziampiris, YEAR, p.138). Following the conference, the EC Ministers issued a joint statement which read in part: "We are willing to recognize that State 8 […] within its existing borders, and under a name that can be accepted by all parties involved" (EC Press Release in ibid.). This statement was significant for two reasons. First, it took the territory question off of the negotiations table before Macedonia was ever even present. Second, it guaranteed that Macedonia would be part of future deliberations, but also that those deliberations would take place in an arena where Greece had the upper hand. As Tziampiris notes, it was always within Greece's political capabilities to veto an EC decision and considering the emotional weight that this issue carried in Greece, veto power was never far from policy makers' minds (ibid., p.140). Macedonia was not an EC Member State and not even a recognized

nation-state and of course did not have veto power in the EC. The Guimaraes decision was so significant then because it forced Macedonia to play this name game on Greece's terms. After the Guimaraes decision, Macedonia was bound to accept a name proposed by the EC. It "could not simply reject an EPC (I've never heard of this term before, you sure he's using it in his work?) proposed name and then seek UN recognition under the name Republic of Macedonia" (ibid., p.140). Finally, as Greece had veto power in the EC and Macedonia did not, any potential names needed to first pass Greece's scrutiny.

The fact that Macedonia applies for membership of international organizations that Greece is already a member of, does in one sense give Greece an advantage in negotiations and particularly, it gives the Hellenic Republic the ability to perpetuate its politicized version of history. However, on the other hand, having to balance its foreign associations with its domestically willed policies, has negatively affected both Greece's capacity to export its version of history, as well as its general international reputation. As a non-member of NATO, the EU, the UN, or any other international agency, Macedonia had very little to lose in its negotiations on the name conflict. In fact, Macedonia's persistence on this issue stems from their desire to join these organizations. Greece, by contrast, has been a member of the pertinent international agencies since before the breakup of Yugoslavia. Greece used its membership to its advantage in the name conflict negotiations but also suffered a great blow to its foreign reputation when its policies diverged from the international community's. Analysis of Greece's relationship with the international community throughout the 1990s and up to the present day reveals the degree to which Greece is invested in its particular conception of history.

By the close of 1992, the international community was beginning to seriously doubt the motivations behind Greek policy recommendations. Aristotle Tziampiris states that throughout 1992, EC and Greek opinions on the Macedonia issue grew further apart. In the eyes of the international community, there was a "gradual decline of the politics of Greek cooperation, the rise of popular passions, and the dominance in importance of the issue of FYROM's name" (Tziampiris, YEAR, p.125). The "strong Nationalist flavour" in Greek foreign policy was hardly subtle and becoming impossible for the international community to ignore (Demertzis et al., YEAR, p.29). Greece's unbending stance on the Macedonia question is perhaps best expressed in the now infamous letter sent to the EC Foreign Ministers by Greece's then-Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras. On January 17, 1992, Samaras laid out a four-part argument as to why "the Republic of Skopje" must not be granted the title Macedonia and more importantly, the version of history and territorial claims implied in that title. Samaras utilizes bold language that paints Greece as the victim of unwarrantable claims by Skopje. He writes, for example, that "Skopje

attempted to appropriate and monopolize the Macedonian name…" and in doing so, "usurped Greek historical and cultural heritage in Macedonia from antiquity to present" (letter 17 January 1992, I'm guessing this is an online source? Just cite it as such.). He also underscores the "constant threat to peace and security" that an independent Republic of Macedonia would pose to South Eastern Europe. Samaras paints a picture of economic, social, and political destruction. He goes so far as to argue that a 'free Skopje' would incite "guerilla warfare and armed conflict involving neighbouring states" with the potential of "igniting the whole Balkan area and becoming a major destabilization factor for the whole of Europe" (ibid.).

These opinions are not a power play by a politician but rather emblematic of domestic opinion at the time. Demertzis, Papathanassopoulos and Armenakis conducted an in-depth analysis of how the Macedonia question was portrayed in the Greek media throughout the 1990s. Study of Greek newspapers in 1991 and 1992 reveal that "defensive and offensive Nationalist discourse" dominated the media and political agenda in Greece at the time. Moreover, on April 13, 1992, Greece would set forth the same opinions touted in Samara's letter as its official stance on the issue (Tziampiris, YEAR, p.122). From that moment forward, Macedonia began its own offensive, paying special attention to the international community that could ultimately put it on equal footing with Greece in policy negotiations. For example, Macedonia passed its new national flag and requested to join the UN. Greece countered with an oil embargo that had devastating consequences on Macedonia's economy. In total, in the first year of Macedonia's independence, Greece showed that it was more committed to protecting its Nationalist version of history than it was to its foreign relations.

1993 marked a turning point in the Macedonia's relationship with the international community. On April 8, 1993, the UN admitted the nation under the "temporary name" that international actors still use today; the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (Encyclopedia of the United Nations… ,1355). In the second half of the year, all EU member states besides Greece followed the UN's lead and formally recognized Macedonia. The United States and Russia also gave their formal recognition in the start of 1994. Macedonia received another strong sign of support from international actors when the European Commission filed suit against Greece in the Court of Justice for its embargo against its neighbour (ibid.). Though the Court ruled in Greece's favour, the gesture alone revealed the extent to which the tides of opinion had turned in the international community. By the end of the year, Greek policies on the Macedonian issue were viewed by many as "extremely non-cooperative and counterproductive, ultimately endangering the efforts to contain and end the Yugoslav War" (Tziampiris, YEAR, p.xix).

As had already been mentioned in previous sections, in September 1995, Greece and Macedonia finally made a positive step in the direction of resolution. Under the mediation efforts of the United Nations, the two nations signed the 1995 Interim Accords. This document declared that the nations agreed to respect existing frontiers and allow for the free movement of people, goods, and services between them (Proper citation needed, encyclopedia of the United Nations… 1355). Demertzis et al.'s study of Greek media shows that the Accord was more than a symbolic gesture. According to opinion polls, in 1995, a majority of Greek people were willing to see a new agreement come to fruition with Macedonia (Demertzis et al, YEAR, 37). However, it is important to note that the authors' study led them to conclude that the Greek people warmed to the Interim Accords because of "pragmatism rather than a deep change in attitude" (ibid., 41). By 1995, Greece had no choice but to accept that every influential international player had accepted and formally acknowledged Macedonia and that Greek adamancy on the issue was taking a real toll on its foreign relations.

Riding the coattails of the negative media storm surrounding the Greek embargo, Macedonia submitted its application to the European Union in March of 2004. In September 2005, the European Commission returned a very positive review of Macedonia to the Council of Ministers and formally recommended that the country become a candidate for EU accession (Communication from the Commission SEC (2005) 1425). By the end of the year, Macedonia had been granted candidate status by the EU. For the next few years, however, its application stood at a standstill.

In April 2008 the name conflict recaptured the international community's attention when the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) considered Macedonia's bid to join. Though the details of the debate stayed behind closed doors, the consensus is that "Greek objections over the name dispute" were the reason Macedonia's entry was blocked (still needs proper citation, EurActiv). In the end, NATO refused to take sides on the issue and turned the responsibility back to Greek and Macedonian politicians. In the declaration released following the Bucharest Summit, NATO issued the following statement: "an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name has been reached" (still needs proper citation, NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration, point 20).

Several months later, the EU came to a very similar conclusion on the conflict. On the June 23, the EU announced "resolution of the name dispute with Greece" to be a necessary "precondition of EU accession" (still needs proper citation, EurActiv). In December of 2008, only several months after NATO and the EU's stern advisements to reach a solution, Macedonia

renamed its capital airport to 'Alexander the Great' airport, as was discussed before. It thereby reignited passionate debates on both the Greek and Macedonians sides and reminded the EU of the challenges associated with resolution between the nations.

Almost a year later, the European Parliament issued a motion of Resolution evaluating the political, economic, and social developments in the FYROM. Although generally positive, the resolution closes with emphasis on the need for resolution with Greece before accession talks can proceed. Parliament states that it "encourages the two countries to redouble their efforts at the highest level to find a mutually satisfactory solution to the name issue" (still proper citation needed, European Parliament "Motion for a Resolution" B7-0000/2009, point 19). The resolution then goes on to directly address the politicization of history employed by both sides. The Resolution notes the Parliament's "concern" with "the use of historical arguments" and warns that, "the recent phenomenon of so-called 'antiquisation'… risks increasing tensions" (still proper citation needed, European Parliament, "Motion for a Resolution"). In this way, the European Union was able to signal its disapproval of both sides' preoccupation with retelling history so that it reflects their national goals.

The 2009 Motion from the European Parliament represents the general international sentiment on the issue. International agencies are not deeply invested in the debate and wish only that it come to a final, amicable close. External actors were never preoccupied with the actual name and see both sides' obsession with the issue as a formidable obstacle in the way of Macedonia's progress on the international scene.

Most recently, the Macedonia question has been back in the news because of discussions between Greece, Macedonia, and the United Nations (UN). On September 20, 2010, Greek Foreign Minister Droutsas met with the UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for Macedonia name issue. The following day, Droutsas posted a short reflection on the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Droutsas writes, "I had the opportunity to reiterate once again Greece's position on the Skopje name issue. It is a well known position; a clear, consistent, credible and honest position" (still proper citation needed, http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/21092010_ALK1106.htm accessed 17 Oct). He continues explaining that he made plain that there is only one solution that Greece can accept, and that is "a geographical qualifier for every use" (ibid.). In his final paragraph, Droutsas signals both Greece's unbending commitment to its version of the solution as well as the negative feelings that persist between the nations. Droutsas writes, "Greece's political will is well known, it is sincere. I only the other side's will were as sincere…" (ibid.). Three days later, the FYROM president, Gjorge Ivanov, told the UN General

Assembly that he would like to reach a "mutually acceptable solution" (still proper citation needed, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36167&Cr=greece&Cr1, accessed 11 oct). However, he also showed no signs of caving on his nation's stance. He invoked human rights rhetoric, suggesting his nations' persisting opinion that it is the victim in this name dispute. Ivanov communicated that beholden in the name dispute, is the nation's "right to self-identification and human dignity" (ibid.).

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