***Course: Power-Sharing Agreements in Deeply Divided Societies  
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***Did the US and EU Impose Power-Sharing on Macedonia in 2001?***

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*With regard to the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, NATO is fully committed to that nation's security, stability and territorial integrity. I welcome the common response of all citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, including ethnic Albanians, in condemning attempts to destabilise their country*.[[1]](#footnote-1)

**Introduction**  
 The conflict which threatened the stability of Macedonia[[2]](#footnote-2) in 2001 did not occur in a regional or geopolitical vacuum. Macedonia at this time was affected by the violence in neighboring Kosovo and Serbia, and the presence of international agencies and peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. However, Macedonia has also proven to be a unique case within a region which has seen much violence. A short summary of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Macedonia’s emergence in the early 1990s will be necessary. Macedonia must be placed in the context of a new state struggling to gain international recognition while juggling internal differences of religion and ethnicity.   
 Before exploring the theoretical considerations of power sharing and whether it was imposed, I will examine the form of government that was established in Macedonia before 2001 by the 1991 constitution. This initial Macedonian constitution was a root cause of the 2001 conflict because of its unequal treatment of minorities.[[3]](#footnote-3) The significance of a ten-year history of coalitions in government between Albanian and Macedonian parties must not be overlooked. Although it has been argued that some Albanians may have favored full independence, a “Greater Albania” or even union with Kosovo or Albania, the events of 2001 prove that the central issue was one of gaining equal rights of citizenship through constitutional change.[[4]](#footnote-4)   
 Finally, I will analyze the events and violence of 2001 in order to assess the policies, intensions, and actions of external and internal actors in the crisis which ultimately culminated in the Ohrid Framework Agreement. This approach allows me to determine whether or not the United States, European Union, and NATO[[5]](#footnote-5) imposed power sharing on Macedonia. The nature of ‘imposition’ is such that it requires unwelcome coercion paired with the implementation of a specific vision of politics. In light of the evidence, I believe that power sharing existed in Macedonia prior to 2001, though imperfectly.   
**The 1990s: Dawn of a Sovereign Macedonia** The dissolution of Yugoslavia was just the beginning for several new states in the Western Balkans. Macedonia, the southernmost of these, largely avoided the ethnic wars that afflicted Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.[[6]](#footnote-6) This meant that the small state of Macedonia avoided the massive casualties and ethnic polarization of its neighbors, and had the chance to develop its own political institutions. Macedonia struggled to gain international recognition because of Greek opposition to the name ‘Macedonia,’ a region which Greece ties to its own history.[[7]](#footnote-7) Largely because of this opposition, although Macedonia entered the UN in 1993, it was denied entry into the Council of Europe and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe until 1995.[[8]](#footnote-8)  
 Macedonia declared its sovereignty in January of 1991, but it did not declare independence until after it had approved a constitution in mid-November of that year.[[9]](#footnote-9) Macedonia used its newfound sovereignty to attract the recognition of international bodies such as the European Commission, and although the Badenter Commission determined Macedonia was fit for diplomatic recognition, Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia – not Macedonia – were recognized.[[10]](#footnote-10)  
**The 1990s: Imperfect Constitution; Consistent Coalitions**  
 The first Constitution of Macedonia received praise from EC Arbitration Commission in 1991.[[11]](#footnote-11) Although clearly a positive step, this praise overlooked fundamental problems which the constitution created inside the country. The central, though not only, bone of contention was the preamble of the constitution which stated:

“Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia”[[12]](#footnote-12)

The preamble essentially placed ethnic (Slavic) Macedonians above the *de facto* second class citizenship status of the “other nationalities,” and seemed to the Albanians to be an unfair attempt to create a nation-state. This is a significant problem for a country in which Albanians constitute a significant minority of about 23%, according to the 1994 census.[[13]](#footnote-13)  
 Additional ethnic Albanian complaints centered on issues such as the reference to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, without acknowledging the name of other religions or places of worship.[[14]](#footnote-14) This didn’t only impact the Albanian Muslims, but also Turks and other Muslims. The inequality of languages in the constitution is often cited as another problem, due to the fact that the Macedonian language was required to be taught in schools located in Albanian districts where Macedonian was a minority language.[[15]](#footnote-15) Regardless of these legitimate grievances, Albanian parties actively participated in the governance of the state. With the exception of a “clandestine referendum” on Albanian independence in 1992, Albanians aired their complaints through legitimate political means during much of the 1990s.[[16]](#footnote-16)  
 It is important to highlight the participation of Albanian parties in the government of Macedonia since the first democratic elections there in 1990. In this first election, two allied Albanian parties won a total of 22 out of the 120 seats in the national assembly, amounting to 18.3 percent representation.[[17]](#footnote-17) This was almost proportional to the number of Albanians in the country. Significantly, each of the Macedonian “governments since 1991 have been coalitions,” all of which included an Albanian party among the ethnic (Slavic) Macedonian parties.[[18]](#footnote-18)   
 In 1994, a new coalition was formed following the election to the Presidency of Kiro Gligorov for a second term. The parliamentary elections were accused of fraud, and the initial results were scrapped. The second go around resulted in the new coalition, Alliance for Macedonia, gaining 95 seats. The coalition included the Alliance for Macedonia “and a number of Albanians.”[[19]](#footnote-19) This was a turbulent year for Macedonian politics as the opposition consistently challenged the legitimacy of the government which was losing support for “its economic program and policies toward the Albanians.”[[20]](#footnote-20) Making matters more complicated, the main Albanian party, the PDP, split up with only one faction actively supporting the Macedonian political system.[[21]](#footnote-21)  
 A new round of elections in 1998 ushered in changes as the more radical Albanian party, Arben Xhaferi’s Democratic party of Albanians (DPA) took 11 seats and formed a coalition with the nationalist Macedonian party VMRO-DPMNE (47 seats), and the Democratic Alternative (DA) with 12 seats which had Communist roots.[[22]](#footnote-22) This shift in representation was significant because not only was a new coalition formed to challenge the Alliance for Macedonia, this new coalition also included Albanian and Macedonian parties. In essence, one multi-ethnic coalition replaced another through peaceful political means.   
 Zhidas Daskalovski writes persuasively about the ‘stateness problem’ in Macedonia. This problem was based on ethnic Albanian rejection of the state as conceived by Macedonian elites in the early 1990s.[[23]](#footnote-23) The preamble of the constitution was protested from the very outset by the Albanian parties who boycotted the special session of parliament concerning the document’s adoption.[[24]](#footnote-24) This rejection of legitimacy coincided with the participation of Albanian parties which “generally preferred to cooperate with the government in order to resolve their minority issues.”[[25]](#footnote-25)  
 The proportional level of Albanian representation in government throughout the 1990s, in addition to a consistent creation of coalitions, show that Macedonia had a form of power-sharing in place before 2001. The transition out of Yugoslavia and into a Macedonian polity was not completely smooth, as the 1994 elections illustrate, but the first decade of Macedonian politics was also largely non-violent. The existence of key elements of power-sharing strikes to the heart of the argument that power-sharing was externally imposed by the US and EU in 2001. **Imposition of Power-Sharing?**  
 Today, Macedonia is regarded as one of the “new wave” cases of consociational government.[[26]](#footnote-26) The 1991 constitution however, established a direct democracy model in which individuals may vote freely and “establish associations of citizens and political parties, and may join them or resign from them.”[[27]](#footnote-27) This design contributed to the veritable alphabet soup of political parties in the country.[[28]](#footnote-28) The need to form coalitions is a key element of any power sharing arrangement, and Macedonia is an important example of why a prior experience of coalition governance is essential. Many of Macedonia’s parties are defined along ethnic rather than political or ideological lines.[[29]](#footnote-29)  
 According to Arend Lijphart, a consociation must have a “grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy,” while he describes the grand coalition as “the principle of power-sharing.”[[30]](#footnote-30) Emphasizing Lijphart’s point, John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary argue that “what makes consociations feasible and work is joint consent … with the emphasis on ‘joint-ness’.”[[31]](#footnote-31)   
 The question being addressed by this paper concerns the imposition of power-sharing in Macedonia by the EU and USA, in 2001.[[32]](#footnote-32) In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine what is meant by ‘imposition’. Imposition is defined by the level of coercion employed, which can occur through diplomatic, military, or economic means. Pavlos I Koktsidis explains that “coercion is the most prevalent mechanism for reaching desirable political outcomes or averting undesirable ones.”[[33]](#footnote-33) While this is a strong theoretical pillar to stand on, the actual coercion employed by external actors in Macedonia is trickier to determine, with much of the diplomatic engagement occurring behind closed doors, or in private conversations between external and internal elites.[[34]](#footnote-34) What these conversations tend to suggest is not so much coercion, but cooperation on the elite level.  
 Michael Kerr explains that “coercive external forces” can act to provide “political motives and incentives” that can push internal elites to act, and more specifically, “to engage in power-sharing.”[[35]](#footnote-35) Yet, in the case of Macedonia, it is unclear whether the external actors actually used coercive diplomacy for this particular end. A thorough reading of NATO press releases produces a collection of vague references to democratic ideals, but very few clues elucidating a supposed goal of imposing power-sharing in Macedonia.[[36]](#footnote-36) When a coalition government is mentioned by NATO, it seems to be the exception that proves the rule because it doesn’t appear until July 2001, months after the violence began, and more than three months after the NLA posted its demands online.[[37]](#footnote-37) This should be surprising, as Macedonia by 2001 had already experienced a decade of power-sharing.  
 Kerr’s focus on the relevance of positive and negative external influences on Lebanon and Northern Ireland’s power sharing regimes provides a helpful way to look at Macedonia. Most significantly, Albania did not even have a coherent policy to deal with Macedonian Albanians. Arjan Hilaj notes that the Albanian government issued “statements where the government pledged its support for Macedonia security and urged Albanian guerrillas to lay down arms and seek a peaceful solution.”[[38]](#footnote-38) This is nearly the same response of NATO’s leadership to the crisis, which simply added to the international consensus that violence must stop.  
 Does the lack of segmental autonomy and mutual veto powers suggest that Macedonia in the 1990s was not a power-sharing government? I’d like to contest this notion and argue that the necessity of the coalition building due to the proliferation of political parties and need to gain a majority in the 1990s strongly supports the theory that Macedonia was a “power-sharer,” though not a full consociation, for the entire decade.   
**2001: Crisis, Coercion, Compromise** By late February 2001the fighting had begun in Macedonia. *The Economist* described a “two hour skirmish” between armed ethnic Albanians and Macedonian security in Tanusevci.[[39]](#footnote-39) The article expresses fears that more fighting could expand from Serbia into Macedonia. These fears were not new. In the same news magazine nine years prior, the fear was “if conflict erupts in Kosovo…Albanians from Macedonia could join in the fighting.”[[40]](#footnote-40) In 1999, Kosovo was on fire. Although the Macedonian government thought it could only manage 20,000 refugees,[[41]](#footnote-41) at one point, it was host to as many as 350,000, a “15% increase of its total population.”[[42]](#footnote-42) These refugees being from Kosovo meant that they were mostly ethnic Albanians. The refugee crisis was triggered in part by the air campaign against Yugoslavia by NATO.[[43]](#footnote-43) Andrew Rossos argues that “[e]xtreme Albanian nationalists” who may have crossed the border from Kosovo during and after 1999 “used Albanian grievances as a pretext to launch armed incursions against Macedonia” in 2001 with an aim of creating a Greater Albania.[[44]](#footnote-44)   
 The NATO force in Kosovo at the time of the 2001 crisis was referred to as ‘Kfor’. This peacekeeping force was constituted “entirely” of American soldiers of the 82nd Airborne.[[45]](#footnote-45) Kfor became NATO’s right arm on the border between Kosovo and Macedonia, and their presence there was instrumental at important moments in the conflict, such as during the evacuation of Albanian rebels at the end of June.[[46]](#footnote-46) Kfor can be seen as an American representative as well as a NATO force, and overlap such as this was a very evident theme during the 2001 conflict. In many ways, the level of cooperation and policy coordination between the United States and EU can be seen through the lens of NATO actions on the ground and its many press releases. In June 2001, *The Economist* acknowledged this state of affairs:

“Given that the EU and NATO, overlapping bodies that used to ignore one another, are now supposed to act as co-managers of Europe’s security, it would have been an ominous sign if the two Brussels-based clubs had failed to send a clear signal.”[[47]](#footnote-47)

What was the clear message these “overlapping bodies” intended to send? Did they coordinate a plan of consociational democracy in Macedonia as a way to solve the ethnic problems created by the 2001 Constitution? Official NATO press releases during the conflict suggest that this was not the case. Although NATO, The EU, and the US were coordinating efforts in Macedonia, there was initially no clear goal other than to end the violence in the country “through peaceful means.”[[48]](#footnote-48) One press release after another during the violent period echoes this policy, which can be nicely summarized as “we are determined that the men of violence will not succeed.”[[49]](#footnote-49)   
 The violent men in Macedonia were mostly ethnic Albanian rebels in the west of the country. A National Liberation Army (NLA) was “formed in part from men and material left from the [Kosovar] KLA.”[[50]](#footnote-50) NATO officially referred to these guerilla rebels as “extremist elements” and “extremist groups,” while only directly naming the NLA in late May 2001.[[51]](#footnote-51) This approach to labeling the rebels was not accidental, and represented the international community’s policy that extremists had “no democratic legitimacy, and thus no place at the negotiating table.”[[52]](#footnote-52) Ironically, this changed quickly in May as US diplomat Robert Frowick of OSCE facilitated an agreement between the NLA and the ethnic Albanian parties DPA and DPD.[[53]](#footnote-53) This agreement not only effectively brought the rebels to the negotiating table, but also precipitated the acknowledgement of the Prizren document which focused on the issues central to ethnic Albanian grievances, and the document was “incorporated in the first draft of the Framework Document” and eventually in the Ohrid Framework Agreement.[[54]](#footnote-54)   
 Diplomatic intervention was led by the EU and OSCE, but did not significantly differ from the rhetoric of NATO against violence, and eventually in support of a political solution.[[55]](#footnote-55) What stands out about the diplomacy of these organizations is the fact that it can be described as pre-emptive. Not only does NATO see their actions in this way, they believe what they did in Macedonia was to stop “a low-level insurgency turning into a full-blown civil war.”[[56]](#footnote-56) Much has been made of the “stick-and-carrot” style of intervention by the international community, particularly relating to EU conditionality for accession as “a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward.”[[57]](#footnote-57) While the carrot of EU accession was attractive for the Macedonia elite,[[58]](#footnote-58) this does not match the rhetoric of NATO, the US, or the EU during the 2001 crisis. These external forces were focused on halting the violence in the country, and were especially cognizant of the danger of a conflict in Macedonia becoming “Balkan-wide.”[[59]](#footnote-59) Yet, as mentioned above, Macedonia was blessed by the lack of a negative external influence in Albania, as that country “declared its respect for the territorial integrity of Macedonia.”[[60]](#footnote-60)  
 Both the BBC and Annika Björkdahl have referred to EU intervention in Macedonia as a “testing ground” for the foreign or defense policies of Europe.[[61]](#footnote-61) Björkdahl importantly explains the dynamic of EU as norm-maker and Macedonia as norm-taker, but her analysis is empty of any reference to the EU as *imposer* of power-sharing. The emphasis on norms, rather than specific political institutions or constitutional engineering shows the level of involvement of the EU in Macedonia, but falls short of the imposition of power-sharing.  
 The US Secretary of State Colin Powell made the American position abundantly clear at a press conference with Macedonian Foreign Minister Srdjan Kerim:

“It is not a solution that America can impose or a plan that we present to you to be executed. You have our advice, you have our best wishes, you have our counsel, you have our support.”[[62]](#footnote-62)  
  
This leaves little firepower in the argument that the US imposed power-sharing.

Two weeks of negotiations were concluded at Lake Ohrid on August 13th 2001, as the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was signed by the Macedonian President, representatives from two Macedonian and two ethnic Albanian parties, in addition to an EU and American representative.[[63]](#footnote-63) Conspicuously absent were the NLA, as “an informal understanding between NATO and the insurgents” allowed the rebels to remain in place, while essentially being represented by the PDP and DPA.[[64]](#footnote-64) Due to the mediation by the EU and US, the OFA was officially written in English, and the document specifically addresses the grievances of the Albanian minority, including the Constitutional preamble, multi-ethnicity, local self-government, religion, and languages.[[65]](#footnote-65) Section 9 of the document specifies the details of the agreed constitutional amendments.[[66]](#footnote-66) Section 5.1 specifically prohibits the central government from changing the Law on Local Self-Government without a two-thirds majority “within which there must be a majority of the votes of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority.”[[67]](#footnote-67) This is known as the ‘Badinter principle.’[[68]](#footnote-68)  
**Conclusion**  
 The changes agreed upon at Ohrid in 2001 were turned into constitutional amendments in November 2001, institutionalizing the changes brought about by the peace process.[[69]](#footnote-69) Implementation of the Badinter principle as well as the improvement of minority rights and local-governance helped Macedonia transform from a power-sharing democracy, into a consociational democracy. As I have argued, power-sharing existed for a decade prior to the 2001 conflict and peace negotiations in Macedonia. In fact, this “record of previous cooperation” was actually more relevant to the success of the peace negotiations than whether or not power-sharing as a political system was imposed.[[70]](#footnote-70)  
 It goes without saying that a diplomatic policy *against* violence is not comparable with actively implementing, establishing, or imposing a specific system of governance such as power-sharing or consociational democracy. While this is self-evident, it is important to stress the positive influence of external actors. The US, EU, NATO, OSCE, and others, as well as the lack of negative influences from neighboring Albania all contributed significantly to a peaceful resolution of the 2001 conflict. However, diplomatic consultation, use of accession to the EU as a ‘carrot,’ and the renunciation of violence do not amount to the imposition of power-sharing.  
 While the US, the EU, and NATO did act coercively in many ways, there is not significant evidence that any of these actors pursued a strategy to impose power sharing, but instead acted primarily to diffuse a violent situation, and only secondarily to encourage political reform.

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   Savković, Marko. “What lessons can be drawn from the negotiation process leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement?” in Risteska, Marja and Zhidas Daskalovski (eds.), *One Decade after the Ohrid Agreement: Lessons (to Be) Learned from the Macedonian Experience*, Skopje: Centre for Research and Policymaking, (2011): pg. 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Rossos, Andrew. “Macedonia and the Macedonians, a History.” *Stanford: Hoover Institution Press*, (2008): Chapter 14 Independent Republic, pg. 278, 280. ;  
   Daskalovski, Zhidas, “Democratic Consolidation and the ‘Stateness’ Problem: The Case of Macedonia.” *Ethnopolitics*, 3:2, (2004): pg. 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. “in NATO the main player was AND IS the USA.” Source: Marolov, Dejan. “The EU policy towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia: Special Emphasis on the EU policy towards the Republic of Macedonia.” *Analytical journal*, V.4.2, (2012): pg. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. These wars are also referred to as “civil wars” and “wars of aggression” in the very same paragraph by John Lampe, which highlights their complexity. Lampe, John R. “Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country.” 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press, (2000): pg 365. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. “[U]sing the word ‘Macedonia’ implied irredentism to Greece.” Source: Marolov, Dejan. “The EU policy towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia: Special Emphasis on the EU policy towards the Republic of Macedonia.” *Analytical journal*, V.4.2, (2012): pg. 16. ;   
   Lampe, John R. “Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country.” 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press, (2000): pg. 394. ;  
   “Macedonia: The Price of a Name.” *The Economist*, Europe, (1 August 1992): pg. 32. ; [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Ibid, pg. 395. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Rossos, Andrew. “Macedonia and the Macedonians, a History.” *Stanford: Hoover Institution Press*, (2008): Chapter 14 Independent Republic, pg. 265-266. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Lampe, John R. “Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country.” 2nd Edition. *Cambridge University Press*, Cambridge (2000): pg. 392. ;  
    Rossos, Andrew. “Macedonia and the Macedonians, a History.” *Stanford: Hoover Institution Press*, (2008): Chapter 14: Independent Republic, pg. 268. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Daskalovski, Zhidas, “Democratic Consolidation and the ‘Stateness’ Problem: The Case of Macedonia.” (2004): pg. 55. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Published in the *Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia,* No.52/1991. (17 November 1991): Preamble. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. This census is controversial, but estimates for Macedonian Albanians do range from 20-30%.   
    Daskalovski, Zhidas, “Democratic Consolidation and the ‘Stateness’ Problem: The Case of Macedonia.” (2004): pg. 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Published in the *Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia,* No.52/1991. (17 November 1991): Article 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid, Article 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The referendum was effectively symbolic because no action was taken to follow up.   
    Daskalovski, Zhidas, “Democratic Consolidation and the ‘Stateness’ Problem: The Case of Macedonia.” (2004): pg. 56. ;   
    “Macedonia: Next on the List.” *The Economist*, Europe, (8 Feb 1991): pg. 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Rossos, Andrew. “Macedonia and the Macedonians, a History.” (2008): pg. 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid, pg. 279. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid, pg. 274. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Ibid, pg. 275. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Daskalovski, Zhidas, “Democratic Consolidation and the ‘Stateness’ Problem: The Case of Macedonia.” (2004): pg. 58. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Rossos, Andrew. “Macedonia and the Macedonians, a History.” (2008): pg. 276. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Daskalovski, Zhidas, “Democratic Consolidation and the ‘Stateness’ Problem: The Case of Macedonia.” (2004): pg. 52-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid, pg. 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Koktsidis, Pavlos I. “How Conflict Spreads: Opportunity Structures and the Diffusion of Conflict in the Republic of Macedonia.” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2014): pg. 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Taylor, Rupert. “Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland conflict.” *Taylor and Francis*. Hoboken, (2009): Introduction pg. 1-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Article 20, paragraph 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Andrew Rossos: “Macedonia and the Macedonians, a History.” (2008): pg. 262-263. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. For example: Macedonian nationalists (VMRO-DPMNE); Albanian (Party for Deomcratic Prosperity, PDP); Turkish (Democratic Party of Turks, DPT); there is also the communist/socialist party (SDSM, formerly SKM and SKM-PDP). Source: Rossos, Andrew. “Macedonia and the Macedonians, a History.” (2008): pg. 262. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Lijphart, Arend. “Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links.” *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 12 No. 3, (1979): pg. 500. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. McGarry J & O’Leary B. “Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland's Conflict, and its Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland.” *Government and Opposition*, 41 (1), (2006): pg. 62-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. By extension, NATO must also be examined. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Koktsidis, Pavlos I. “Nipping an Insurgency in the Bud—Part I: Theory and Practice of Non-military Coercion in FYR Macedonia.” *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 12:2, (2013): pg. 186. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. For instance, the NATO Secretary General said on June 11th 2001: “President Trajkovski and I talked today and I welcomed his intention to move forward on a comprehensive proposal for ending the crisis.” Source: NATO Press Release 091. ;   
    June 25th: “I have been in close touch with President Trajkovski.” Source: NATO Press Release 096. ;  
    In regards to NATO and the NLA see,  
    “War or Peace in Macedonia: Will the doves really fly?” *The Economist*, Europe, (18 Aug 2001): pg. 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Kerr, Michael. “Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon.” *Irish Academic Press*, Dublin, (2005): pg. 28, 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. A few of the mentions:  
    NATO Press Release 055: “a country that is a successful example of a well-functioning democracy” ;   
    NATO Press Release 075: “democratic political process” ;  
    NATO Press Release 093: “political dialogue.” [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. NATO Press Release M-NAC-D-1, 88: “we welcome the establishment of a broad coalition government.”  
    Savković, Marko. “What lessons can be drawn from the negotiation process leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement?” in Risteska, Marja and Zhidas Daskalovski (eds.), *One Decade after the Ohrid Agreement: Lessons (to Be) Learned from the Macedonian Experience*, Skopje: Centre for Research and Policymaking, (2011): pg. 212. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Hilaj, Arjan. “The Albanian National Question and the Myth of Greater Albania.” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 26:3, (2013): pg. 410. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. “Macedonia: Passing Clouds?.” *The Economist*, Europe, (3 March 2001): pg. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. “Macedonia: The Price of a Name.” *The Economist*, Europe, (1 August 1992): pg. 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Daskalovski, Zhidas, “Democratic Consolidation and the ‘Stateness’ Problem: The Case of Macedonia.” (2004): pg. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Savković, Marko. “What lessons can be drawn from the negotiation process leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement?” in Risteska, Marja and Zhidas Daskalovski (eds.), *One Decade after the Ohrid Agreement: Lessons (to Be) Learned from the Macedonian Experience*, Skopje: Centre for Research and Policymaking, (2011): pg. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Ibid ;  
    Daskalovski, Zhidas, “Democratic Consolidation and the ‘Stateness’ Problem: The Case of Macedonia.” (2004): pg. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Rossos, Andrew. “Macedonia and the Macedonians, a History.” *Stanford: Hoover Institution Press*, (2008): Chapter 14. Independent Republic pg. 280. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Fisher, Ian. “NATO Acts in Macedonia.” *The New York Times*, Week in Review, (1 July 2001): Page 2, Column 2. ;  
    “Oh no, not war in Macedonia as well.” *The Economist*, Europe, (10 March 2001): pg. 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Fisher, Ian. “NATO Acts in Macedonia.” *The New York Times*, Week in Review, (1 July 2001): Page 2, Column 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. “Macedonia’s ethnic fighting: On a knife-edge.” *The Economist*, Europe, (2 June 2001): pg. 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. NATO Press Release 032, (2 March 2001). The link to more articles containing variations of this phrase is here: <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/home.htm#pr> [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. NATO Press Release 041, (21 March 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Savković, Marko. “What lessons can be drawn from the negotiation process leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement?” in Risteska, Marja and Zhidas Daskalovski (eds.), *One Decade after the Ohrid Agreement: Lessons (to Be) Learned from the Macedonian Experience*, Skopje: Centre for Research and Policymaking, (2011): pg. 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. NATO Press Release 041, (21 March 2001). ;  
    NATO Press Release 075, (24 May 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. NATO Press Release 075, (24 May 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Savković, Marko. “What lessons can be drawn from the negotiation process leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement?” in Risteska, Marja and Zhidas Daskalovski (eds.), *One Decade after the Ohrid Agreement: Lessons (to Be) Learned from the Macedonian Experience*, Skopje: Centre for Research and Policymaking, (2011): pg. 210-212. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Ibid. Savković names the EU High Representative, NATO Secretary General, Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, the US, UK and French Ambassadors as well as special envoys as all being involved in this cooperative diplomacy (pg. 210). [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Laity, Mark. “White Hall Papers: Preface.” *Royal United Services Institute*, 68:1, (2007): pg. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), quoted in Kacarska, Simonida and Gorica Atanasova. “The Role of External Actors in Civil Society Building: The Case of the Republic of Macedonia.” *CEU Political Science Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2009): pg. 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. In an intelligent and strategic move, President Trajkovski requested NATO’s presence in the country, giving the EU “an opportunity to test its crisis management capacity.” Source: Björkdahl, Annika. “Norm-maker and Norm-taker: Exploring the Normative Influence of the EU in Macedonia.” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10, (2005): pg. 265. ;  
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61. Björkdahl, Annika. “Norm-maker and Norm-taker: Exploring the Normative Influence of the EU in Macedonia.” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10, (2005): pg. 257. ;  
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65. Ohrid Framework Agreement. *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*. Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia, (13 August 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Ibid, Section 5, Paragraph 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Savković, Marko. “What lessons can be drawn from the negotiation process leading to the Ohrid Framework Agreement?” in Risteska, Marja and Zhidas Daskalovski (eds.), *One Decade after the Ohrid Agreement: Lessons (to Be) Learned from the Macedonian Experience*, Skopje: Centre for Research and Policymaking, (2011): pg. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Nadège Ragaru. “Macedonia: Between Ohrid and Brussels.” *Cahiers de Chaillot*, 2008, pg. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Ibid, 209. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)